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FREEDOM AND INTERDEPENDENCE
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONTRACT LAW:
TRAYNOR AND HAND AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Alfred S. Konefsky*

[D]efendant offered to deliver the linoleum in exchange for
the plaintiff's acceptance, not for its bid, which was a matter of
indifference to it.1
Learned Hand in Baird v. Gimbel (1933).

Though defendant did not bargain for this use of its bid
neither did defendant2 make it idly, indifferent to whether it
would be used or not.
Roger Traynor in Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958).

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1958, Judge Roger Traynor, writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court in Drennan v. Star Paving, rejected a form of
analysis offered exactly twenty-five years before by Judge Learned
Hand in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision of Baird v.
Gimbel Both cases addressed a contractual problem in the bidding process in the construction industry: What are the legal
consequences of a general contractor's use of a subcontractor's
low bid that is subsequently discovered to have contained a mistake? Although the decisions have often invited comparison, I
believe those comparisons have overlooked the evidence that
Traynor deliberately targeted and rejected the Bairddecision and
Hand's reasoning.
* Professor, School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. I am grateful
for the permission of Jonathan Hand Churchill, literary executor of the estate of
Learned Hand, to quote from the Hand Papers on deposit at the Harvard Law School
Library. I would like to thank David Leve for his valuable research assistance; Marcia
Zubrow, Head of the Reference Department at the Law Library, State University of New
York at Buffalo, for her help in locating source material; and Joyce Farrell for her assistance in preparation of the manuscript. A number of readers provided helpful comments: Greg Alexander, David Engel, Gerald Gunther, Eric Holmes, Peter Linzer, Stewart Macaulay, James McCall, Catherine McCauliff, Frank Munger, Edward Purcell, John
Henry Schlegel, G. Edward White, and James Wooten. In particular, Dianne Avery contributed a variety of important insights. The usual disclaimer about responsibility
applies.
1. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (emphasis
added).
2. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958) (emphasis added).
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Applying traditional common-law rules of consideration and
offer and acceptance, Hand determined that no liability for
breach of contract flowed from subcontractor to general contractor because the subcontractor had exercised the right to revoke
the offer before the general contractor had accepted. Therefore,
according to Hand, no bilateral contract had been formed. He
also went on to say that no liability could be assessed against the
subcontractor as a result of reliance-based notions of promissory
estoppel, strongly suggesting that promissory estoppel had no
place in the rough and tumble world of commercial practice.
A generation later, Traynor also concluded that no legal liability arose in the situation if the conventional rules of offer and
acceptance applied. Unlike Hand, however, Traynor believed that
liability should be imposed in this factual context by application
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which, from his point of
view, accurately reflected the true vulnerability of general contractors in the marketplace caused by their reliance on bids prepared and submitted to them by subcontractors.
Baird and Drennan are frequently juxtaposed in contracts
casebooks as a "textbook" example of contrasting doctrinal approaches to a legal problem.3 Students are often asked in notes
following the cases to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the analyses developed by the judges. 4 Treatise and textbook writers, concerned with a higher level of generality and
theory, have likewise noted the relationship between the two.
opinions-commenting that Drennan "is inevitably to be con-

3. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON et al., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTs (6th ed. 1993)
(1993); FRIEDRICH KESSLER et al., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986);
CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW (3d ed. 1993). Ta-

bles showing how often Baird and Drennan appear as a "main case" in selected
casebooks can be found in Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in
Contracts, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REy. 1379, 1460, 1465 (1995).
4. See, e.g., HARRY W. JONES et al., CASES AND MATERIAL S ON CONTRACTS 479 (1965)
("Hand v. Traynor"); JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 288 (4th ed.
1991) ("Hand versus Traynor"); JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS

290 (3d ed. 1983) ("In a jurisdiction taking the position urged by Judge Hand, can you
draft a provision that would protect the general contractor? In a jurisdiction following
the Traynor position, can you draft a provision protecting the subcontractor?"); ROBERT
E. ScoTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 244 (2d ed. 1993) ("Questions on Baird and Drennan. Compare the two opinions carefully. Exactly what point of
disagreement separates Justice Traynor and Judge Hand?"); EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 409 (4th ed. 1991) ("How does Uustice Traynor] avoid Judge Hand's reasoning in Baird?"); KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 3, at 239
("Does Justice Traynor in his Drennan opinion effectively counter [Judge Hand's]
arguments?").
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trasted with" Baird,5 or that Drennan "made a dramatic departure
6
from [the] traditional analysis" in Baird.
The scholarly literature on the cases is voluminous. Most of
the commentary on the subject fits broadly into the law reform
tradition, prevalent in law reviews, that seeks the best expression
or distillation of the legal rule to fit the commercial situation.
The lead articles and student notes and comments range from
attempts to address the narrow doctrinal issues raised by the
cases (and to choose which approach is better) to analysis that
places the cases in the wider world of promissory estoppel doctrine and its jurisprudential context. 7 Some of the studies present
empirical evidence to test whether the legal rules reflect commercial reality. Implicitly or explicitly, they argue that law ought
to conform to business practice as part of a legal reform agenda
in support of better rules (whatever that means) or a more re-

5. MARVIN A, CHIRELSTEIN,CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CoNTRACrS 47

(2d ed. 1993).
6. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 199 (2d ed. 1990); see alsoJOHN E. MURRAY, JR.,
CorArcrs 124-27, 284-87 (3d ed. 1990); 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD,TRATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs §8.6, at 118-27 (4th ed. 1992).
7. The doctrinal examinations include: Thomas P. Lambert, Comment, Bid Shopping
and Peddling in the Subcontract Construction Industry, 18 U.C.LA L. REV. 389 (1970); Dorothy Hemmer Bishop, Comment, The Subcontractor's Bid: An Option Contract Arising
Through Promissory Estoppel, 34 EMORY LJ.421 (1985); Kenneth L. Schriber, Note, Construction Contracts-TheProblem of Offer and Acceptance in the General Contractor-Subcontractor
Relationship,37 U. CIN. L.REV. 798 (1968); John B. Gaides, Note, The "Firm Offer" Problem
in ConstructionBids and the Need for PromissoryEstoppel 10 WM. & MARY L.REV. 212 (1968);
Lawrence Lederman, Note, Once Around the Flag Pole: Construction Bidding and Contracts at
Formation,39 NYU. L REv. 816 (1964); Janine McPeters Murphy, Note, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractors' Liability in Construction Bidding Cases, 63 N.C. L. REv. 387 (1985). For
examination of broader issues see Randy E. Barnett & Mary E, Becker, Beyond Reliance:
Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Mismpresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443
(1987); Michael L. Closen & Donald G. Weiland, The ConstructionIndustry Bidding Cases:
Application of TraditionalContract, Promissory Estoppel, and Other Theories to the Relations Between General Contractors and Subcontractors, 13 J. MARSHALL L.REv. 565 (1980); Daniel A.
Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond PromissoryEstoppeL" Contract Law and the "Invisible
Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L.REV. 903 (1985); Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel andJudicial
Method, 97 HARv. L.REV. 678 (1984); Stanley D. Henderson, PromissoryEstoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE LJ. 343 (1969); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised
Restatement: The Proliferationof Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L.REV. 52 (1981); Margaret
N. Kniffin, Innovation or Aberration: Recovery for Reliance on a Contract Offer, as Permitted by
the New Restatement (Second) of Contracts,62 U. DET. L.REv. 23 (1984); Juliet P. Kostritsky,
A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise of PromissoryEstoppel: An Ex-

planation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895 (1987); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J.
Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35
RUTGERS L REV. 472 (1983); G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of
Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221 (1991); Edward
Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE LJ. 111 (1991).
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fined application of rules.8 Like latter-day Llewellyns, these scholars march relentlessly in pursuit of the "situation sense" with the
assumption that by either pouring in or drawing out the "realities" of the bidding process, they will yield a normative rule satisfactory to all parties.9 Perhaps Malcolm Sharp's warning, issued
over forty years ago, bears repeating: "[H] owever much the judgments of members of a trade may need careful attention by
courts, it is always possible that in some respects their judgments
represent limited or biased points of view which must be
discounted."1 0
The historical change from Hand's approach to Traynor's analysis focuses on the introduction of the modern innovation of
promissory estoppel into the realm of commercial litigation. The
conventional interpretation of the rise of promissory estoppel positions it as a primary example of the shift from the "highly individualistic" contract doctrine of the late nineteenth century to a
twentieth century contract environment emphasizing an "interventionist, protectionist spirit" leading "to the welfare state
and beyond.""u Under this view, "promissory estoppel is probably
best seen as an outgrowth of a more interdependent, community-oriented moral climate .... ,,2 The norm of "discrete transactions among autonomous actors" is replaced by "integrated exchanges" in which people rely on one another.1 3 Therefore, in
order to encourage reliance, modern doctrinal devices in contract law have been created stressing the value of "foster[ing]
trust between economic actors. Trust is viewed as a moral good,
8. Empiricism in the law reviews is therefore justified by its presumed link to more
reflective and efficacious rules and is tolerated for that limited purpose. The data on
the bidding process is often useful, interesting, and subject to different interpretations.
The gathering of empirical evidence on the subject began with Franklin M. Schultz, The

Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practicein the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L.REv.
237 (1952). See also Note, Another Look at Construction Bidding and Contracts at Formation,

53 VA. L REV. 1720 (1967); 'Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy,
1992 Wis. L. REV. 26-30 (1992).
9. See KARL Lt£ELL, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 268 (1960). See generally Wit,
LIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REAusT MOVEMENT (1973); Richard Danzig, A

Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975).
Interestingly, Karl Uewellyn was Roger Traynor's first year contracts teacher in the summer of 1924 at the law school at Berkeley. See JAMES McCALL. THE LIFE OF ROGER TRAYNOR. REFORM AND THE PURSUIT OF JUsTICE (forthcoming) (manuscript ch. 3, at 17-18).

10. Malcolm Sharp, Promises, Mistake, and Reciprocity, 19 U. CHI. L REV. 286, 286
(1952). Sharp's article was drafted as a response to Schultz's empirical study. See Schultz,
supra note 8.
11. Metzger & Phillips, supra note 7, at 475, 505, 506.
12. Id. at 506-07.
13. Feinman, supra note 7, at 716.

1997]

CONTRACT LAW

1173

as well as an economic asset. It allows coordination and planning
between economic actors and fosters the formation of valuable
economic institutions."1 4 Historically, "[p]erhaps ... traditional
contract law was adequate to foster the degree of trust society
needed in economic activities. Today, an increasingly interdependent society needs to foster trust in a variety of relationships not
readily organized through the device of the formal contract.""5
The presumption, then, is that the triggering mechanism for
doctrinal change in twentieth century contract law is the recognition of the concept of "interdependence" in modern capitalist
relations. In the aftermath of the Depression, Lon Fuller observed that "with an increasing interdependence among members of society, we may expect to see reliance .. .become increasingly important as a basis of liability." 16 In Baird, Learned
Hand viewed the commercial transaction at issue through the
lens of individualism and formalism. Traynor, however, impatient
with the traditional application of individualism to contract law,
sought to transform that law by sanctioning the increasingly interdependent activities of marketplace actors. Hand apparently
feared that sanctioning such inroads into conventional contract
doctrine would inhibit the individual exercise of freedom in a
democratic society. Traynor, on the contrary, believed that individual autonomy would be encouraged by freeing economic actors to arrange their transactions in light of an "increasingly" interrelated world. Therefore, Traynor thought that the reliance
principle recognized and enhanced individual freedom in an interdependent universe.
Traynor offered a modern doctrinal revision of the ideology of
contract law, forged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, that Hand had embraced. Traynor did not entirely reject the individualistic rationale of contract law. Rather, by altering the relationship between freedom and individualism, Traynor
sought to insure the survival of individualism and to contribute
to its growth by refurbishing the ideology with a current, modern version. Freedom and individualism became compatible with
trust, reliance, and interdependence because, in a modern economy, it would be in one's self-interest to behave in this rational,
related way rather than in an atomistic manner that pitted everyone against each other. Traynor seems to be treating promissory
14. Farber and Matheson, supra note 7,at 945.

15. Id.
16. Lon Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L REv. 799, 823 (1941).
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estoppel not as an idealistic concept derived from altruism and
community, nor as an alternative to an individualistic ethic-as
some historical accounts would have it-but instead as a modem
adaptation or strain of individualism. Although it would be easy
to portray Hand as the "formalist" and Traynor as the "progressive," this characterization would miscast the complexities of
their ideas. Both believed in the efficacy of legal rules and in the
primacy of individual freedom and its attendant responsibilities
and opportunities.
Terry Fisher has recently identified four major trends in legal
history that can be traced to methodologies of modem intellectual history: structuralism, contextualism, textualism, and the
new historicism. "Textualists," he observed, "typically concentrate
on 'great' or canonical texts (read noncanonically) . . .and the
Contextualists typically seek to identify the common themes and
assumptions in the writings of the members of a discursive community (and then interpret individual texts in light of those assumptions).... 17 This examination of legal doctrine is being offered not just for what it says about doctrine as doctrine, but also
for whatever broader meaning it reveals through the use of the
methodology it employs. Although textualist and contextualist arguments might be viewed as antagonistic, this essay suggests that
it is possible to write at the boundaries between the methodologies and perhaps to imply the possibility of convergence by using
legal doctrine as text-not as an end in itself, but as a method of
investigating the evolution and influence of legal ideas that, in
part, provide the context of judicial decisionmaking.
I propose to study Baird and Drennan by addressing the extent
to which Traynor specifically focused on reforming Hand's solution to the legal problem in Baird.There is internal and external
evidence for this claim. Within the cases, for example, Traynor's
Drennan opinion in 1958 directly uses Hand's language from
1933 in reaching an opposite conclusion. In other words, Traynor carefully selected words that Hand employed and turned the
phraseology on its head. I do not think that Traynor's use of
Hand's words was accidental. In addition, some of Traynor's
opinion is parallel in structure to Hand's organization. Traynor
also provides an ideological justification for the result in 1958

17. William W. Fisher, III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal Hist"y
of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L REv. 1065, 1071 (1997).
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that directly repudiates Hand's rationale in defense of the result
in Baird.

The external evidence that Traynor discarded Hand's mode of
analysis stems from Traynor's general attitudes about the relationship between precedent, social change, and legal change. In
his extrajudicial writings, as well as in his opinions, Traynor
evinced a certain impatience with what he perceived to be roadblocks to effective legal change. Traynor, in fact, indicated not
just that the doctrinal result in Baird ought to be different, but
that a fundamental rethinking of contract law was in order. To
Traynor, Hand represented a remnant of the past-the iron rule
of formalism. Traynor suggested a new model of contract analysis, and he forthrightly proposed to jettison both the outcome
and the reasoning reached by Hand's generation ofjudges. What
better way to accomplish this purpose than to demonstrate that
Hand's own language could be used to justify a directly opposite
approach and conclusion? More importantly, Traynor wrote
about the Drennan case on more than one occasion, revealing
what he thought the case signified as he detailed its doctrinal
contribution and consequences. He was engaged in and defended self-conscious change.
This is an essay then about both the fragility and endurance of
legal ideas. It is also an essay on the nature of legal reform, revealing both its long term origins centered around particular
ideas, as well as its contingent and idiosyncratic nature. In order
to understand the Baird and Drennan cases and the relationship
between them, it will be necessary to recreate the contexts in
which Hand and Traynor wrote their opinions. The factual and
doctrinal setting of Hand's opinion in the Baird case will be
presented in light of the trial record at the federal district court
level, the appellate briefs, and the Second Circuit preconference
memorandums circulated between the judges. The examination
of these materials will help place Hand's work in the context of
the legal ordering of the dispute. The analysis of Traynor's opinion will also take into account the appellate briefs filed in the
Drennan case, as well as the intervening legal developments between 1933 and 1958. In addition, Traynor's extrajudicial views
on judging and the legal process will be examined for the light
that they shed on the Drennan opinion, and even, perhaps, for
what Traynor may have thought about Learned Hand.
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II. THE CASES
A.

The FactualSetting

Both Baird and Drennaninvolve the general contractor/subcontractor bidding process in public works or building construction
projects. Both cases also share certain factual similarities primarily related to the nature of the bidding process itself. In Baird,
as the general contractor prepared to bid for the contract 'to
construct a public building in Pennsylvania, it received numerous
bids for different aspects of the project from various subcontractors. The subcontractor in this dispute was a linoleum jobber
who "sent to some twenty or thirty contractors, likely to bid on
the job, an offer to supply all linoleum required by the specifications." 8 Unfortunately, the subcontractor's bid to the general
contractor contained a mistake because "the employee [who]
computed the amount of the linoleum which would be required
on the job, underestimat[ed] the total yardage by about one-half
the proper amount." 19 Because the subcontractor's bid was the
lowest bid for the linoleum work on the project, the general contractor relied on it in calculating the total amount of its own bid
on the final project.
The chronology is important. The subcontractor sent the "offer" to the general contractor on December 24. The offer said:
"'If successful in being awarded this contract, it will be absolutely guaranteed, * * * and * * * we are offering these prices
for reasonable' (sic), 'prompt acceptance after the general contract has been awarded.' "20 The general contractor received the
offer on December 28 and used it almost immediately in aggregating and submitting its own bid. Later, on the same day, the
subcontractor discovered the mistake and notified the general
contractor that as a result of the mistake it was withdrawing its
offer. Therefore, the telegram containing the withdrawal information arrived after the subcontractor's bid was used by the general contractor. In fact, the trial transcript establishes that the telegram arrived after all of the bids on the public building project
had been opened in Harrisburg and after the general contractor
learned that it was the low bidder.21 The public authorities for-

18. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 345 (2d Cir. 1933).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 345.
21. Transcript of Record, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F2d 344 (2d Cir.
1933), in 2257 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals---Second Circuit-Cases and Briefs, at 36-
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mally accepted the general contractor's bid on December 30.
The subcontractor confirmed its withdrawal in a letter received
by the general contractor on December 31. Despite having been
notified twice that the subcontractor had withdrawn its bid, the
general contractor "formally accepted the offer on January second."2 2 When the subcontractor refused to perform the work,
the general contractor sued the subcontractor for breach of contract, seeking to recover the difference between the price that
the subcontractor bid for the job and the cost incurred by the
general contractor to obtain another subcontractor to do the linoleum work.
As in Baird the facts in Drennan revolve around a mistake in
the bidding process. The general contractor, in this instance, bid
on a public school construction project, and the subcontractor
submitted a bid to the general contractor for the paving work at
the job site. The public authorities required that the general
contractor submit its overall bid by 8:00 p.m. on July 28. Apparently, "it was customary in that area for general contractors to receive the bids of subcontractors by telephone on the day set for
23
bidding and to rely on them in computing their own bids."
When the bids were received by phone, they would be placed
"on a master cost sheet setting forth the names and bids of all
subcontractors." 24 The paving subcontractor phoned in a bid in
the late afternoon of July 28. The general contractor recorded
the bid, posted it on the cost sheet, and selected it as the low
bid for paving. The general contractor's overall bid, including
the subcontractor's offer, proved to be the low bid when it was
opened on July 28, and the general contractor won the
contract.75

The next morning, the general contractor "stopped at defendant's office" and the defendant informed the general contractor
"immediately" that there had been a mistake in its bid and that
it could not do the work for the price that it bid.26 Then, the
subcontractor "refused to do the work for less than"27 a revised
37, 41 (1933) [hereinafter Transcript of Record].
22. Baird, 64 E2d at 345.
23. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 758 (Cal. 1958).
24. Id. By state law, the general contractor was required to list in its own bid on the
complete project all of the subcontractors slated to do work above a certain percentage
of the total job.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 758-59.
27: Id.
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figure. As in Baird,the general contractor sued the subcontractor
for breach of contract seeking to recover the difference between
the original bid price and the cost of performing the contract
with a substituted paving contractor.
Although the factual contours in the cases are similar, they are
not identical. The industries and materials are different. The customary bidding processes are slightly different-written communication (with terms of the offer spelled out) as opposed to logging in on a telephone. The state law in California required the
listing of subcontractors whose bids constituted a certain percentage of the general contractor's total bid, while Pennsylvania law
in the 1920s and 1930s apparently did not. The timing of the notice of mistake is different although the timing may or may not
have legal consequences. And I suppose it is possible to construe
the general contractor's visit to the subcontractor in Drennan as
an attempt to accept the offer to do the paving work prior to the
subcontractor's communication of the mistake and withdrawal of
the bid. However, the real question is: What are the legal implications of the facts whether similar or different? Will the subcontractor be contractually bound by its bid to the general contractor if the general contractor relies on or uses the bid?
B.

The Legal and Doctrinal Setting

The legal analysis of the cases takes place against the backdrop
of the rules governing the revocability of offers-one of the eternal verities of the common law of contracts. The rules stipulate
28
that an offer may be revoked at any time prior to acceptance.
As a result of the legal operation of the rule, an offeree, faced
with the presumption of revocability, can only change revocability to irrevocability by purchasing a change in its status, an option. A statute may also alter the legal situation in some jurisdictions and so may a seal. The offeree may exchange
consideration-usually money-in order to limit the offeror's legal right to revoke prior to acceptance. Unless a bargain has occurred on the subject of revocability itself, the legal presumption
of revocability applies. It is in this way that consideration doctrine casts its shadow onto the domain of offer and acceptance.
Reform of this system of analysis has been slow on the common-

28. See

(1981).

FARNSWORTH,

supranote 6, at 161; RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CoNTRACs §

42
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law front. The firm offer provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code have made some progress on the subject for signed writings, stipulating that those offers with terms which indicate that
they will be held open will, therefore, not be revocable even
though they lack consideration.2 9 However, under the standard
rules of offer and acceptance, the subcontractor would be entitled, after discovering its mistake, to revoke its offer to the general contractor provided that the general contractor had not already accepted the offer in some way.
The assumptions underlying the traditional rules of offer and
acceptance seem to stem from a design for a simple, rather than
a complex, world-a universe composed of face-to-face transactions in which people deal with one another on an individual basis rather than engaging in impersonal communication. It is a bipolar world-offer and acceptance, or offer and counter-offer, or
offeror and offeree. The problem is that the modem world of
general contractor/subcontractor is not exactly a bipolar world
of diametrically opposed actors seeking pure individual advantage against each other, although it retains overtones of this
premise.
First, the reality of this particular commercial situation is that
the general contractor/subcontractor relationship is only one of
many similar bipolar settings that are repeated often as the general contractor gets ready to bid. In effect, each individual subcontractor, as a result of the aggregation of all bids, has an impact on the outcome of every other subcontractor's bid
submitted on different, often unrelated parts of the project. Second, each general contractor/subcontractor bid process triggers
another set or level of potential offer and acceptance situations
between the general contractor and the awarding or granting authority. In effect, the general contractor/subcontractor bipolar
exchange is embedded in a multipolar and multilevel system. For
instance, if the general contractor is never awarded the main
contract-with its own offer and acceptance-then the subcontractor is never awarded its subcontract. On the other hand, the
subcontractor's bid seems to be grounded on the idea that it
wants the general contractor, to whom it has submitted a bid, to
be awarded the general contract so that the subcontractor can
get the work. The transaction between the general contractor

29. U.C.C. § 205.
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and the subcontractor may be individual or discrete, but their
fate appears to be linked.
It is, of course, possible to treat all of the individual and triggered transactions in the general contractor/subcontractor bidding model as discrete transactions awaiting resolution under the
traditional offer and acceptance rules. The problems are more
than a little reminiscent of the way that the classical apparatus of
contract law sought to adapt to the problems of making contracts by correspondence in the absence of face-to-face communication. The "mailbox" rule appeared in early nineteenth-century
England to solve a modern, market-expanding, technology-driven
dilemma not initially contemplated by the original set of common-law rules. Therefore, out of the common-law evolutionary
process emerged a 'rule that made the acceptance of a contractual offer by correspondence effective upon dispatch in the
mailbox, thereby creating an acceptance at the earliest possible
moment, so early, in fact, that the original offeror was not yet
aware of it.30 However, the problem was resolved within the para-

digm of the conventional rules. It is clearly possible to analyze
the general contractor/subcontractor interaction as if it fit under
offer and acceptance, classically construed.
Yet, there is at least one other contractual model with which to
construe these events. Instead of casting the interaction between
general contractor and subcontractor into an individualistic sequence of discrete transactions, it is possible to evaluate the true
impact of their interaction in relational terms-terms not always
readily translatable into the conventional world of offer and acceptance. For instance, one might interpret the general contractor/subcontractor transaction as only one episode in a relationship dedicated to the same outcome-the awarding of the
general contract. Rather than pursuing mutual advantage against
each other, both parties might be primarily concerned with finding mutual advantage for each other. One succeeds only if both
succeed. It is not necessary for both parties to be engaged in a
long-term relationship (like a franchise) for this model to be applied, though, it is possible that a subcontractor may work for a
general contractor on many different projects, each of which is
separate and discrete. Presumably, subcontractors also are interested in sustaining a long-term reputation within an industry or
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981); Adams v. Lindsell, 1
Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (1818); Ian R. Macneil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many
Piblkmsfor a Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L Rv. 947 (1964).
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trade that would stress reliability, cooperation, and trust. The relationship between a general contractor and a subcontractor,
therefore, is likely to appear to be a curious amalgam of discrete
transactional and relational norms. If relational norms acquired
a certain legal recognition, then one might expect to hear general contractors claiming, after the relationship broke down or
was not formally consummated, that their legal rights were based
on their reliance on reasonably construed representations or on
offers made by subcontractors. The claim would stem from how
they understood the relationship was supposed to work and not
from the nature of any individual transaction. 31
Under either a transactional or relational theory, it is possible
to focus on different possibilities of contract formation or obligation in the general contractor/subcontractor setting. One could
argue either for or against the formation of a bilateral contract,
a unilateral contract, an option contract, or some form of liability arising under promissory estoppel. At some point in these
cases, virtually all of these theories were advanced by the parties
and considered in the judicial opinions.
C.

The Opinions: The Law Applied to the Facts

1. The Path to Baird
a.

The Trial

Baird v. Gimbel was tried in the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York in December 1931, approximately
four years after the precipitating, events transpired in late 1927
and two years after the complaint was filed in November 1929. A
two-day bench trial was conducted by Federal District Judge
Frank J. Coleman. 32 Exactly one witness was presented on behalf
of the general contractor; only three witnesses were introduced
for the subcontractor. The trial lawyers were relatively young Wall
Street attorneys who were well on their way to prominent and
distinguished careers. George Leisure appeared as trial counsel
31. See Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts,47 S. CAL L REv. 691 (1974);
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of LongTerm Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-

classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE
NEw SOCIAl. CONTRACt: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACrUAL RELATIONS (1980).

32. See Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 1. When one considers that the Second Circuit opinion was not issued until April of 1933, perhaps we should not be complaining in the 1990s about delays in the justice system.
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for the general contractor around the time that the Donovan
and Leisure law firm was founded. Leonard P. Moore of the
Chadbourne, Stanchfield, and Levy firm, who within twenty-five
years would sit on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit as Learned Hand's colleague, represented the
33
subcontractor.
The plaintiff's complaint in the action alleged two causes of
action-one sounding in contract and one in promissory estoppel. The contract cause of action asserted offer and acceptance
of the subcontractor's bid; the promissory estoppel cause of action asserted the general contractor's reliance on the subcontractor's bid. The subcontractor's answer to the complaint denied
that any offer, acceptance, or reliance had occurred and additionally contended that no binding agreement, was formed because the "offer" had been revoked before acceptance and there
had been a mistake in the offer; therefore, no meeting of the
34
minds occurred.
The overwhelming majority of the trial testimony was on the
subject of mistake. The general contractor's only witness,
Thomas McKnew, vice-president of the Baird firm, was called primarily to authenticate and to introduce the documents exchanged by the parties at the time of the events-hardly a contested matter. Most of his testimony on cross, redirect, and
recross examination, devoted to the subject of mistake, focused
on whether the general contractor should have noticed the mistake in the bid. McKnew deftly fended off Moore's suggestion
that the general contractor somehow shared responsibility for
the mistake. He countered that general contractors usually did
not know the individual specifications of the specializations on
jobs'-that was the job of the subcontractor-and that the final
bid gathering process was chaotic with little time to check for errors, which was why subcontracting firms are selected based on
good reputations, such as Gimbel-they were careful and respon35
sible and could be trusted.
The defense witnesses all focused on mistake. Presumably,
once the documents were introduced, the issue of offer and ac33. For biographical information on Leisure, see George Stanley Leisure, in C. W. TAYLOR, JR., EMINENT MEMBERS OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW YORK 265 (1943). The founding of Donovan & Leisure is dated to 1929. See ERWIN CHEROVSKY, THE GUIDE TO NEW
YoRK LAW FIRMS 85 (1991). For biographical information on Moore, see JEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 175 (1987).

34. See Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 10-16.
35. See id. at 62-68.
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ceptance. and revocation resolved itself into a legal issue. The
only meaningful factual inquiry left was raised by the subcontractor's defense of mistake. The three defense witnesses, a linoleum
contract department estimator from Gimbel, a linoleum contract
department salesman from Gimbel, and a manager/estimator for
another general contractor who had bid on the project, all
sought, in various ways, to establish that a genuine mistake had
occurred and that the general contractor should have recognized
it. For instance, there was some testimony at trial about whether
the variations in bid figures should have alerted the Baird firm,
as it apparently did other general contractors, that a mistake had
36
been made.
Two unpublished federal district court opinions emerged from
the pretrial and trial stages. First, in July 1931, Judge William
Bondy issued an opinion in response to a defense motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Bondy denied the motion; therefore,
clearing the way for trial. He chose to interpret the first cause of
action "as meaning that the offer was made in consideration of
or on condition of plaintiff's submitting [to the public granting
authority] a proposal in writing computed and based on defendant's offer to plaintiff."37 In other words, the allegation was that
"the defendant bargained for an act by the plaintiff in exchange
for its promise to install the linoleum at the option and on demand of plaintiff at that price." 38 When the general contractor
submitted its bid including the bid prepared by the subcontractor, "the performance of the act, before any notice of revocation, constituted the consideration which made the offer
" 39
irrevocable.
As a result of Judge Bondy's strained interpretation of the nature of the offer, the general contractor barely survived the
defendant's motion:
The defendant's offer, as alleged in the complaint, was not limited to an offer to install the linoleum at a certain price but
there was an additional promise that if the offer was used by
the plaintiff in making its bid, it could call on defendant to furnish the linoleum at the stated price. By reason of that promise
and the submission of a bid for the general contract by the
36.
37.
(2d Cir.
app., at
38.
39.

See id. at 80-134.
Brief of Defendant-Appellee, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344
1933), in 2257 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals-Second Circuit-Cases and Briefs,
54-55 (1933) [hereinafter Brief of Defendant-Appellee].
Id. at 55.
Id.
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plaintiff computed and based upon defendant's offer the plaintiff was assured that the linoleum could be installed at that
price.4
Judge Bondy was not at all certain, however, about the promissory estoppel claim. "It is doubtful," he wrote, "whether a cause
of action can be based on a promissory estoppel in this case," 41
because, although the general contractor alleged that he relied
on the subcontractor's promise, he did "not allege that the
promise was made in order to induce this action in reliance." 42
Section 90 of the first Restatement of Contracts, which established the elements of a promissory estoppel, might be employed
in theory. "But this doctrine has been applied only to charitable
subscriptions, promises to make gifts, etc. ..

. and not to ordi-

nary business transactions. ' 43 Therefore, the suggestion was
made: promissory estoppel should not apply to commercial
promises.
Judge Coleman issued his opinion less than two months after
the conclusion of the trial. He found in favor of the subcontractor. "The principal question presented," he wrote, "is whether
the defendant had a right to withdraw an offer to supply linoleum for a building about to be erected, before the offer was formally accepted." 44 According to Judge Coleman, the general contractor had argued that the subcontractor had no right to
withdraw its offer for two reasons paralleling the two counts of
the complaint. First, "the circumstances gave rise to an implied
contract between the parties that the offer would not be withdrawn until the plaintiff had had a reasonable opportunity to accept it," and second, "if no such contract to continue the offer
could be spelled out, the defendant was, nevertheless, estopped
from withdrawing it because of a change of position by the plaintiff in reliance upon it." 4s
About the general contractor's first argument, Judge Coleman
concluded:
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 55-56.
43. Id. at 56 (citation omitted). Section 90 read: "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." RESTATEmENT oF Coimrucrs § 90 (1932).

44. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 190.
45. Id. at 191.
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The parties undoubtedly expected that the offer would be kept
good and they contemplated that it would be some guide to
the plaintiff in determining the cost of the building and consequently the amount of the plaintiff's bid. The circumstances,
however, are not sufficient to justify a finding that there was a
mutual intention that the offer would be kept good in consideration for the plaintiff's doing some definite thing. The
defendant had no way of anticipating exactly what use the
46
plaintiff might make of it.
Therefore, nothing had transpired legally to convert the offer
from revocable to irrevocable, and the offer had been withdrawn
prior to acceptance.
The plaintiff remained free to reject the offer even if it were included in the bid submitted to the State. The fact that the parties contemplated that the plaintiff might possibly make some
undefined use of the offer in determining the amount of its
bid was insufficient to show in conjunction with defendant's letter that the parties made a contract that the offer would not be
47
withdrawn.
Addressing the reliance claim, Judge Coleman responded to
Judge Bondy's admonition about the applicability of promissory
estoppel to commercial transactions by observing that " [w ] hether
or not the theory of promissory estoppel should be applied to
ordinary business contracts the present case lies outside the rule
because of the vagueness and indefiniteness of what the plaintiff
might do in reliance on the offer."48 Then, Judge Coleman revealed what really troubled him about using promissory estoppel
to alter the common-law understanding of the revocability of offers: "To hold otherwise would make a large proportion of all offers irrevocable because of the indubitable possibility that the offerees might rely on them and change their positions
accordingly." 49 In other words, in a business environment, there
was no real limitation on the possible claims of reliance on offers. Recognizing these claims and changing the legal rules
might lead to unlimited chaos, vulnerability, and liability unless
parties adjusted their dealings accordingly. Certainty and predictability were threatened by the specter of business people running
around wildly seeking enforceability based on specious claims of

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. at 195-96.
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noninduced and open-ended reliance. The opinion concluded
without a single mention of the legal problem of mistake, which
had been the primary focus of the trial. A revoked offer before
acceptance apparently meant that there was no need to discuss
the defense of mistake.
b.

The Appellate Briefs

By the time the appellate briefs were filed in February and
March of 1933, George Leisure had left the case for the general
contractor. William L. Glenn, who apparently had handled the
original pleadings in 1929 while at a different law firm, resumed
control of the case.50 He changed the strategy in light of judge
Coleman's opinion, sirice the problem was now how to find a legal basis for contending that acceptance had taken place before
revocation.
•'Glenn argued that "[d]efendant's offer for the linoleum subcontract ripened into a contract at and with plaintiff's bid to the
State." 51 In other words, the use of the subcontractor's bid by the
general contractor amounted to an acceptance of an offer. The
plaintiff now argued that "defendant plainly meant, 'If you
choose to accept my offer you may act upon it by bidding.' " In
addition, "[t]he proposal, in short, called for an unilateral contract, it was accepted by plaintiff's act, and plaintiff was not required to notify defendant of acceptance."52
The justification for this form of analysis was based on the nature of the wording of the subcontractor's offer:
The bid was made, as it had to be, within an hour or so after
this letter was received. Under such circumstances the phrase,
"reasonable prompt acceptance after the general contract has
been awarded," must be interpreted as a condition subsequent
to a contract already made. By acting on defendant's bid, plain50. See Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 8. On the brief with William Glenn
was Garrard Glenn, a legal treatise writer and law professor. Garrard Glenn taught at
Columbia's law school in the teens and early twenties. In 1933, he was teaching at the
University of Virginia Law School. He practiced law in New York City between leaving
Columbia and joining Virginia. SeeJuLIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW:
COLUMBIA UNIVECsrrY 252-53, 264 (1955); W. Hamilton Bryson, GarrardGlenn, in ]LEGAL
EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH 241-48 (W. Hamilton

Bryson ed., 1982).
51. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344
(2d Cir. 1993), in 2257 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals-Second Circuit--Cases and Briefs,
at 9 (1933) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant].
52. Id. at 10.
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tiff would change its position. Defendant's letter did not say,
"You may act on our bid, and still have no contract with us."
The more reasonable interpretation is, "We mean to be bound
if you act on our bid. But, in case you do not get the award
from the State, then our contract shall be at an end." Else of
what value was defendant's offer, and how could plaintiff act on
it safely? But with this treated as a condition subsequent it was
natural that defendant should desire to be advised promptly if
53
plaintiff got the contract.
So, "[v ] iewed in that light, neither defendant's telegram nor its
letter, both of which reached plaintiff after the latter had put in
its bid to the State... , could operate as die revocation of an offer which called for acceptance by act, plaintiff having performed the act before notice of revocation." 54
Addressing the promissory estoppel issue, the brief writers observed that "plaintiff's act (submitting to the Commonwealth its
proposal, based upon the defendant's offer) was induced by the
defendant's offer and thus furnished a consideration which rendered the offer irrevocable." 55 The entire discussion of the substantive operation of promissory estoppel was one paragraph in
length and occupied exactly one-half of a page in a twenty-three
page brief.56 In contrast, over half of the entire brief was devoted
to various aspects of the mistake issue even though Judge Coleman did not mention it at all in his opinion and neither would
Judge Hand for the Second Circuit.
The subcontractor's brief was long-fifty pages plus an appendix reprinting Judge Bondy's opinion. Signed by Leonard Moore
and David Hecht of the Chadbourne firm, the brief focused
evenly on the revocation, promissory estoppel, and mistake issues. The defendant offered a forceful and direct rebuttal of the
theory that the general contractor accepted the subcontractor's
bid by using it before the subcontractor attempted to revoke it.
The defendant argued that the "proposal... was without consideration and subject to withdrawal and revocation at any time
5
before acceptance in the manner required by the proposal."
Notice that the operative word is "proposal," not offer, not bid,

53. Id. at 11.
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 13-14. The paragraph includes quotation of the text of Section 90 of the
Restatement.
57. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 37, at 9.
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and not promise. The plaintiff's only purported acceptance took
place well after revocation.
This attempted acceptance, not made until defendant had withdrawn its gratuitous offer, was ineffectual, since an offer not
under seal and without consideration may be revoked by the offeror at any time prior to the acceptance of such offer. To hold
otherwise would be to violate the doctrine of mutuality of obligation and defendant would58be bound to sell although plaintiff
was not bound to purchase.
In addition, the subcontractor "invited the formation of a bilateral contract by an acceptance in the form of a promise by the
plaintiff to perform what the offer requested, namely, the
purchase of the linoleum. This was not the case of an offer looking towards a unilateral contract." 59 To the contrary, "[t]he letter
does not indicate that defendant bargained for or desired anything other than to sell its linoleum." 60 Then, the defendant offered an insight that would be reflected in Hand's opinion and
rejected many years later by Traynor. The defendant argued, "It
had nothing to gain by plaintiff's submission of its own bid to
the State for the general contract .. ."61
The brief then turned to promissory estoppel, allocating a full
fourteen pages to a subject that the plaintiff's brief had covered
in one paragraph that consisted of four sentences totaling ninetythree words. It was like taking a sledge hammer to a pebble. The
defendant's brief described the general contractor's theory as a
claim that promissory estoppel should be invoked because the
submission of the bid to the state was in reliance on the subcontractor's offer, which "either estopped defendant from withdrawing its offer or constituted sufficient consideration to make the
offer irrevocable." 62 Reliance, under any circumstance, was not
justified-particularly as a substitute for consideration-because
unequivocally "[t]he doctrine of promissory estoppel may not be
invoked in ordinary commercial transactions." 63 The doctrine was
reserved for "a limited group of cases such as charitable contributions [and] [e]ven in these cases courts are loath to talk in
terms of promissory estoppel for fear of asserting too general a
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 20.
63. Id.at 21.
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principle of law which might be misunderstood to be precedent
for other situations where its application would be
undesirable."64
The threatening implications of allowing promissory estoppel
were spelled out:
If this doctrine were invoked in the usual business transaction,
where the person making an offer desires primarily an advantageous contract and is not seeking to bestow a benefit upon
someone else without contemplating the receipt of something
in return himself, it would radically change universally accepted
and relied upon sound precepts of commercial contract law. Assume a business firm desires to sell merchandise and makes an
offer, without receiving any consideration therefor, to sell at a
price and before the offer is accepted and before it receives an
assurance that the offeree will buy the merchandise it has an
opportunity to sell the same merchandise to someone else.
Must it then forego this opportunity to sell because the original
offeree without communicating to it in any way and without obligating itself to buy the merchandise may have entered into
some arrangement with a third person to purchase the merchandise which was the subject of the offer, perhaps only to
learn thereafter that the original person to whom the offer was
made will not buy the merchandise? Is a business firm which
makes a gratuitous offer to sell merchandise not to be permitted to revoke before acceptance because the offeree does an
act not called for by and in no way beneficial to the offeror?
.Such a rule would not only be unduly harsh on the offeror, but
would achieve a result opposed to commonly accepted commercial practice, as well as being commercially undesirable. 65
The defendant maintained that nothing should interfere with an
individual's business judgment about what was in its best interest
or how best to calculate its own advantage, certainly not the unbargained for reliance of another party. An individual's autonomy was central to freedom of contract and should not be limited, particularly by an action not contemplated, expressed, and
memorialized by some type of bargain.
The answer, according to the brief and soon to be echoed by
Hand, was for the parties, consistent with the idea of pursuing
self-interest, to "protect" themselves. "Sufficient safeguards are
afforded by the law at the present time to protect an offeree who
desires to secure an irrevocable option upon which he may justi-

64. Id. at 21-22.
65. Id. at 24-25.
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fiably rely; he may pay consideration for it if the offeror is willing
to accept the same." 66 The general contractor's bid submission to
the state did not constitute such consideration. Therefore, the
"offer" had not been converted from revocable to irrevocable.
Reliance was only justified if it was induced by a full-fledged bargain. Once again the refrain was that "the defendant had nothing to gain by the plaintiff submitting its own bid to the
[state]." 67 "[The subcontractor] was not bargaining for, nor did
it make any difference to it, whether plaintiff submitted its bid to
the [state]. To hold the defendant bound would destroy the legal character of an option."68 The promissory estoppel section of
the brief concluded with generous quotations from Judge
Bondy's opinion and Judge Coleman's opinion, which rejected
promissory estoppel as an acceptable theory of recovery in the
case.

69

The general contractor's reply brief reinforced its position that
the use of the bid amounted to an acceptance, characterizing
the defendant's position on the subject as "unintentionally misleading" 70 and as undermining "the only rational result."71 More
importantly, in response to the subcontractor's attack on promissory estoppel, the reply brief substantially increased its discussion
of the doctrine-two full pages, or about twenty percent of the
reply brief, instead of the single paragraph in the original brief.
In support and rehabilitation of its argument, the reply brief
quoted a recent editorial from the New York Law Journal to
counter the defendant's assertion that promissory estoppel did
not belong in a commercial setting. As the briefs were being submitted and shortly before oral argument, an editorial dated February 11, 1933, had appeared that was entitled "Promissory Estoppel." The critical line from the editorial quoted by the reply
brief was the conclusion of the author that "[t]he promissory estoppel doctrine is not confined to the charitable subscription
cases." 72 The attorneys thought that the editorial was important

66. Id. at 25.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 32.
69. See id. at 33-34.
70. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d
344 (2d Cir. 1933), in 2257 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals-Second Circuit--Cases and
Briefs, at 4 (1933).
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id. at 7 (quoting Recent Cases, Contracts:Famissory Estoppe, 11 TEX. L.REv. 248
(1933) [hereinafter Recent Cases], reprinted in ProrissoryEstoppe4 N.Y.LJ., Feb. 11, 1933,
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enough to inform the judges that they would "hand up" a clip73
ping of it at oral argument.
The editorial was no more than a verbatim reprinting of a student casenote from the February 1933 issue of the Texas Law Review.74 The timing of its publication in the New York Law Journal

is a little suspicious because it does not seem that promissory estoppel as applied to business transactions was a hot legal topic in
1933. Clearly, the subcontractor would not have had an interest
in having the editorial published, 75 and the general contractor
did not seem to know about it when its original brief was submitted. Whether the attorneys for the general contractor manipulated the editorial publication in the intervening time period
before oral argument is purely speculative, but they certainly
were interested in bringing it to the attention of the court after
the subcontractor's assault on the subject.
As the law stood at the time, the subcontractor may have had
the better argument, or at least it seems to have argued its position more cogently. The general contractor's contentions in the
face of contemporary law were a bit of a reach, which may explain why they were poorly argued. The general contractor was
scrambling to escape the logic of the revocation rules governing
offer and acceptance, The only alternative framework was promissory estoppel-attractive, yet undeveloped and uncharted as applied to this subject area. The Second Circuit would reflect what
the lawyers presented.
c.

The PreconferenceMemoranda

The oral arguments took place in March 1933. After oral argument, it was the custom in the Second Circuit for each individual judge on the panel to write a preconference memorandum.
Gerald Gunther has described the procedure:

at 868).
73. See id.
74. See Recent Cases, supra note 72. The note discussed Langer v. Superior Steel Corp.,
161 A. 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932), an application of the promissory estoppel doctrine to a
pension case, and one of an early line of cases to discuss whether or not promissory estoppel could make certain types of promises enforceable, like pensions, which could
otherwise be treated as donative in intent and therefore not enforceable. See Recent
Cases, supra note 72, at 248-49.
75. The subcontractor's brief in fact had cited and distinguished the Langer case,
the subject of the casenote and editorial. See Defendant-Appellee's Brief, supra note 37,
at 23-24.
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During Hand's years, members of the judicial panel hearing a
case typically did not discuss its issues until more than a week
after the end of the week in which they had heard arguments.
Meanwhile, each judge individually worked through the case
and reached tentative conclusions before ever consulting with
his colleagues. In each judge's chambers, the secretary would
type an informal memorandum on long legal pages, with carbon copies on onionskin sheets to be distributed to the other
judges, Most of the time, a judge's memos made no reference
at all to his colleagues' memos; ordinarily a judge had not read
them until after he had completed his own. Then, when the
judges met face-to-face a week or two later, they had a far
greater familiarity
with the facts and legal issues than was possi6
ble otherwise.7
Fortunately, "Learned Hand saved virtually all the pre-conference
memoranda he and his colleagues wrote during his more than
thirty-five years on the Second Circuit." 77 The Baird v. Gimbel
memorandum is one of them.
The panel was composed of Hand, Thomas Swan, and Martin
Manton. Hand had a low opinion of Manton, 78 a view unfortunately confirmed in 1939 when Manton's resignation from the
bench was followed by his indictment, conviction, and sentencing
on charges of judicial corruption. 79 Manton's preconference
76. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 287 (1994).
77. Id.at 288.
78. See id. at 278, 503.
79. See id. at 503-13. There is an interesting and ironic sidelight to the Manton
scandal involving some of the actors in the Baird case. Thomas L. Chadbourne was the
founding partner of Chadbourne, Stanchfield, and Levy, which was Leonard Moore's
law firm when he handled the Baird case. In 1985, Chadbourne's autobiography was
published with a foreword written by Moore. (The foreword was published after Moore's
death in 1982.) Moore commented that "at the end of 1936 some disagreement must
have occurred between Chadbourne and Levy because as of January 1, 1937, the firm
reverted to its original components," and "that Chadbourne had separated from
Stanchfield & Levy." Leonard P. Moore, FoMVard to THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS L.
CHADBOURNE xvi-xvii (Charles C. Goetsch & Margaret L. Shivers eds., 1985) [hereinafter
CHADBOURNE]. Moore continued:

Levy took with him very few partners. The cause of the sudden breakup
was never disclosed either publicly or to the rank and file of the former
firm. Chadbourne was not one to temporize with any situation that was not
acceptable to him. Thus, whatever the cause, it must have been sufficient in
his judgment to call for immediate separation.
Id. at xvii. The afterword to the book reveals a more complete version of the events.
While still a partner in the Chadbourne firm in 1932, Levy had "arranged" for a
$250,000 loan to Manton's business partner "at a time when one of [the firm's] .. .
cases was pending decision before Chief Judge Manton. The case . ..subsequently was
decided in favor of Levy's client in an opinion written by Chief Judge Manton, and the
$250,000 loan was never repaid." Id. at 231, 294 n.10. Levy was disbarred after Manton's
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memo in Baird is shoddy and rushed. Gunther reports that the
Second Circuit memos "typically ran two to four pages;" 80 Manton's memo was two paragraphs-one paragraph only two
sentences long. Gunther also notes that it was the "norm" for
Manton's memos not to be as "erudite as Hand's."81 In addition,
Manton "had... a reputation of being a 'scissors and paste-pot'
judge who produced many of his opinions simply by lifting useful passages, complete with precedents and legal authority, from
the briefs of the prevailing side."8 2 All that Manton wrote in his
Baird memo was that the offer or "effort" had been withdrawn
before acceptance and that "liability may not be predicated upon
a promissory estoppel." No acceptance had occurred before the
general contractor made its bid to the state, and "the application" of promissory estoppel "is limited to acharitable [sic]
promiser [sic]" and "not to offers made looking forward to the
83
creation of a by-lateral [sic] contract."
Hand was a great admirer of Thomas Swan and was "the leading promoter of Swan's appointment to the Second Circuit"84 after Swan's service for a decade as the dean of the Yale Law
School. Swan's memo, although also short, was far more analytical, trenchant, and searching than Manton's. It was also just as
traditional. The memo paralleled the structure of the subcontractor's brief. "Plaintiff's contention that its making of a bid to the
[s] tate ...

was an acceptance of defendant's offer ...

is a most

preposterous proposition."8 5 On the contrary, "[p]laintiff was
privileged to bid on the building for its own account and
defendant could not by volunteering an offer to supply part of
the material so limit plaintiff's privilege as to convert its bid into
an acceptance of defendant's offer."86 Although the language of
privilege was Hohfeldian, the heart of the idea was pure freedom
of contract. In addition, " [ p] laintiffs act of bidding was not the
consideration defendant wanted to receive in return for its

conviction. See In Re Levy, 30 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
80. GuNTHER, supra note 76, at 288.
81. Id. at 507.
82. Id.
83. "M.T.M.," Preconference memoranda, Baird v. Gimbel, Box 191, File 7, Learned
Hand Papers, Special Collections Department, Harvard Law School Library.
84. Gu HER, supra note 76, at 283. See generally id. at 281-84. See also Learned Hand,
Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE LJ. 167 (1947).
85. "T.W.S.,"Preconference memorandum, supra note 83.
86. Id.
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promise to furnish linoleum."8 7 These were just atomistic actors
looking out for their best interests and, until they thought it was
in their own individual interests to agree, there was no contract.
Indeed, Swan pointed out that the language in the general contractor's letter of January 2, formally accepting the subcontractor's offer, undercut the argument that acceptance occurred
upon submission of the bid. The January 2 letter "did not say
'we hereby notify you that we accepted your offer by tendering
our bid on December 28th'-as it should have said if it construed the proposal as Glenn's extraordinary argument would
have it; it said 'we hereby accept your proposal.' "88
Swan turned next to the promissory estoppel claim, acknowledging that "more may be said for [Glenn's] alternative position-namely, that defendant's offer was irrevocable after plaintiff had acted in reliance upon it. Contract [sic] Restatement sec.
90."89 Nonetheless, as Moore had urged in the subcontractor's
brief, Swan noted that "[t]his principle, however, has never been
extended'to an offer to enter into a bilateral contract with the
offeror or to ordinary commercial transactions, and it should not
be."79 For authority, Swan cited three cases in the precise order
that they appeared in Moore's brief for the subcontractor.91
Three days after Swan's memo, Hand produced his own. Like
Swan, he too followed the structure of the subcontractor's brief.
On the revocation issue, Hand was clear. The general contractor
never accepted the subcontractor's offer prior to revocation.
"Nor had the parties by their past transactions made the plaintiff's bid an acceptance of the offer. No inference of assent was
to be drawn from bidding, not even assent upon condition that
the plaintiff should get the state contract."92 Because the terms
of the subcontrictor's offer looked towards a formal acceptance
(i.e: a reasonably prompt acceptance), "[i]f the plaintiff chose to
bid without accepting, it took its chances of revocation."93 The
general contractor could have chosen "[t]o protect itself" by
making some sort of contract conditional on being awarded the
state job. 94 Having failed to do so, "[c] ertainly there was no con87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; Defendant-Appellee's Brief, supra note 37, at 26-31.
"L.H.," Preconference memorandum, supra note 83.
Id.
Id.
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tract on ordinary principles."95
As for other than "ordinary principles," the general contractor
did not fare any better. Promissory estoppel could not be applied. "[I] t is a total misapprehension of the doctrine to apply it
to an offer which requires a consideration. In such cases the
promise cannot become a contract without the consideration;
that is not its meaning. ' 96 The general contractor's unilateral
contract theory was also rejected. According to Hand, "the
defendant did not promise to deliver if the plaintiff should bid
and the bid was accepted." 97 Hand believed, echoing Moore's
brief, that the subcontractor "had no interest in the plaintiff's
success, it expressly required an acceptance, a promise to pay,
and it never got one." 98 in other words, the subcontractor only
became interested after the awarding of the general contract,
when the general contractor was in a position to close a deal.
Therefore, invoking mutuality, the inequality between the parties, and the vulnerability of the subcontractor rather than the
general contractor, Hand concluded that "[i] t would be a great
injustice to hold the defendant to the outcome of the bid, while
the plaintiff was free to refuse the offer, if it could get better
terms elsewhere." 99
All three judges indicated that they would vote to affirm the
district court's judgment. Despite the prolonged discussions in
the briefs on the defense of mistake, only Swan mentioned the
problem in his memorandum, concluding that, because there
was no contract formation, the decision need not address the issue. 1°° The legal issues had been funneled by the trial, the appellate briefs, and the preconference memorandums into the application of the formal rules of offer, revocation, and acceptance
arrayed against the potential inroads of promissory estoppel theory, freshly minted as announced only recently in 1932 by the
American Law Institute in section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. There could be little doubt about which alternative Hand
preferred.

95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See "T.W.S.," Preconference memorandum, supra note 83.
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The Hand Opinion in Baird

Hand's opinion begins with a sparse, straightforward, perfectly
serviceable rendition of the facts summarized in one long paragraph. The rest of the opinion, comprising just four paragraphs,
is a model of the formalistic application of contract doctrine.
Hand elaborated on themes he had identified in his preconference memorandum, which were in turn derived from the subcontractor's brief. He began by stating the black letter rule and
its operation in this case's factual setting: unless something "out
of the ordinary" occurred, "since the offer was withdrawn before
it was accepted, the acceptance was too late." 10 1 He then proceeded to evaluate the general contractor's response to the invocation of the revocation principle.
Hand noted that the general contractor argued that "[i ] t was a
reasonable implication from the defendant's offer that it should
be irrevocable in case the plaintiff acted upon it, that is to say,
used the prices quoted in making its bid, thus putting itself in a
1°2
position from which it could not withdraw without great loss."
The general contractor, in other words, was stressing its vulnerability-a vulnerability in part created by the use of the subcontractor's bid. It was too late to bid after the mistake was discovered, and the linoleum was a minor portion of the whole
project; therefore, why risk losing this major project ("an unreasonable hardship") and perhaps its substantial deposit by withdrawing its bid on the project after learning of the mistaken
bid?103 The general contractor might have "secured a contract
conditional upon the success of its bid," but the subcontractor
did not have that arrangement in mind. °4 In fact, according to
Hand, the general contractor asserted that such a conditional
contract was unnecessary because the subcontractor knew that
the general contractor "would use its offer in their bids," thereby
binding themselves to provide the linoleum. "The inevitable implication from all this was that when the contractors acted upon
it, they accepted the offer and promised to pay for the linoleum,
in case their bid was accepted."10 5

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F2d 344, 345 (2d Cir. 1933).
IML
See id.
Id.
Id. at 346.
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Hand then proceeded to demolish the general contractor's argument. The premises were purely formalistic. Hand suggested
that the arrangement was possible, but he first analyzed whether
that was what the parties meant or intended-what could be "imputed to the words they used." 1' 6 Hand did not entirely ignore
that the general contractor might have a point, if not a legal
right. "Whatever plausibility there is in the argument, is in the
fact that the defendant must have known the predicament in
which the contractors would be put if it withdrew its offer after
the bids went in."107 However, upon closer examination, Hand

decided: "[I]t seems entirely clear that the contractors did not
suppose that they accepted the offer merely by putting in their
bids."108 The commercial setting suggested that the general contractor preferred to retain as much autonomy as possible. For instance, if the general contractor did not carry out its contract
with the state or if it went bankrupt, the subcontractor would
have no right of action. Therefore, "there was no contract between them." 1°9 Furthermore, the language of the offer, inviting
"'prompt acceptance after the general contract has been
awarded,' looks to the usual communication of an acceptance,
and precludes the idea that the use of the offer in the bidding
shall be the equivalent."" 0 Other interpretations of the acceptance process proffered by the general contractor "would wrench
[the] natural meaning" of the offer's language "too far."11' The
lesson was clear: plan ahead, particularly if you believe you are
vulnerable and sense a "predicament." A conditional contract
provided "a ready escape from their difficulty."

2

Hand closed

his discussion of the issue with an admonition: "[I]n commercial
transactions it does not in the end promote justice to seek
strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect
113
themselves."
With that parting shot, Hand then turned to the general contractor's promissory estoppel claim. It did not fare any better.
The doctrine, according to Hand, was "chiefly found in those
cases where persons subscribe to a venture, usually charitable,
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

110. Id

111. Id.
112. Id. For the conditional contract, see supra text accompanying note 104.
113. Baird, 64 F2d at 346.
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and are held to their promises after it has been completed."1 1 4
However, he noted that "[i]t has been applied much more
broadly . . . and has now been generalized in section 90, of the

Restatement of Contracts."" 5 Having conceded that promissory
estoppel, as recognized in section 90, had moved beyond the relatively confined world of charitable subscriptions, Hand retreated
from the implication-derived from the New York Law Journal/
Texas Law Review source: "We may arguendo accept it as it there
reads, for it does not apply to the case at bar."116 It did not apply
because this case arose out of the cold, cruel, hard-headed, practical world of the bargain-offers, consideration, counter-offers,
promises, counter-promises, exchanges-and not the soft, fuzzy
world of donative intent or gratuitous promises, in which people
might need to be protected by promissory estoppel "to avoid the
harsh results of allowing the promisor in such a case to repudiate, when the promisee has acted in reliance upon the
promise." 17
Hand maintained that the general contractor/subcontractor
relationship was not gratuitous; rather, it presupposed establishing a bargain at some point. "[A]n offer for an exchange is not
meant to become a promise until a consideration has been re-

114. Md
115. Id.
116. Id,
117. Id. One of the solutions may be found, believe it or not, in the revival of the
sealed instrument, signifying the presumptive enforceability of the donative promise. See
id. The passage is accompanied by a "cf" citation to Cardozo's opinion in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Count Bank ofJamestown, as Executor of Mary Y Johnston, 159
N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927), in which Cardozo discussed promissory estoppel in the charitable
subscription context, though concluding that the subscription amounted in that set of
circumstances to a bargain, precluding the necessity of applying promissory estoppel.
The "cf." cite, suggesting comparison, indicates that Hand understood its holding. Both
the general and subcontractor briefs cited Allegheny College, and, needless to say, interpreted the holding in the case differently. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 51,
at 14; Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 37, at 23; Reply Brief for PlaintiffAppellant, supra note 70, at 6. See generally, Alfred S. Konefsky, How To Read, Or at Least
Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny College Case, 36 BuFF.L.REV.645 (1987). Hand was
familiar with the debate over the range of the applicability of promissory estoppel. As a
member of the American Law Institute, he attended the meeting in the spring of 1926
in Washington, D.C., at which the tentative draft of the First Restatement of Contracts
was discussed. See 4 A.L.I. PROC. app. at 5 (1926). In the morning session of April 29,
Hand asked a question about consideration doctrine. See id. at 64. During the famous afternoon session of the same day, when Williston defended the draft section on promissory estoppel (section 88 at the time, later section 90), Hand asked an additional question from the floor on a minor, technical point, see id. at. 90, but he apparently
witnessed the entire, vigorous debate. See id. at 85-114.
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ceived, either a counter-promise or whatever else is stipulated."118
He argued that the formal elements must be satisfied, otherwise
the bargain fails. "In the case at bar the defendant offered to deliver the linoleum in exchange for the plaintiffs acceptance, not
for its bid, which was a matter of indifference to it."119 The bid
may have been a nice idea, but it was not what the subcontractor
wanted, which was an acceptance-a promise "to take and pay
for" the linoleum°---demonstrating that a bargain had been
reached. Hand concluded that "[t]here is no-room in such a situation for the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel.' "121
Finally, Hand dismissed any notion that an option had been
created, allowing the general contractor "to accept the linoleum
at the quoted prices if its bid was accepted, but not binding it to
take and pay, if it could get a better bargain elsewhere," 122 i.e.,
engage in bid shopping. Hand did not think the subcontractor
"meant to subject itself to such a one-sided obligation."123 Under
those circumstances, with mutuality lacking, the vulnerabilities
and inequalities would lie on the subcontractor's side. Hand did
note that, if such an option had been created, it "might" be supported by promissory estoppel if the general contractor had "acted in reliance upon" the option offe, 12A However, he decided
the cases did not support the application of promissory estoppel
to the option theory, and in support, he cited two cases drawn
from the subcontractor's brief and used by Swan in his preconference memorandum.
Thus, Hand had found no bilateral contract because the offer
had been revoked before acceptance, promissory estoppel did
not apply, and an. option had not been created. The opinion
stands as a pillar of traditional, formal, Willistonian contract
analysis. Depending on one's point of view, Hand also relied on,
reflected, was influenced by, or indebted to, the subcontractor's
appellate brief. Some of Hand's most striking concepts and language are drawn from that document even though the opinion
is phrased in his characteristically spartan and crafted manner.
Moore suggested the legal means by which the general contractor might "protect" itself; yet, Hand picked up on the insight
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

James Baird Co.v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933).
1d
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I&
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and expanded it by drawing general policy implications. "[N] or,"
asserted Moore, "did it make any difference" to the subcontractor whether the general contractor used its bid; Hand converted
that thought into his "indifference" principle. 12
The opinion rests on the twin related ideological insights of
"protect yourself" and "indifference"; in other words, the central
tenets of atomistic individualism embodied in the law of contracts. The problem in the case first appeared at trial in a colloquy during the cross-examination by George Leisure, attorney for
the general contractor, of one of the subcontractor's witnesses,
Harry R. Grotz, a linoleum contract salesman for Gimbel. The
discussion involved Leisure, Grotz, and eventually, an intervening, frustrated, if not incredulous federal district judge. The
problem focused on whether the subcontractor "realized" that
the general contractor "might act" on the subcontractor's bid.
Q. When you had made this bid you realized that a general
contractor might act on that, did you not?
A. Sometimes they do and sometimes they don't. It is never
binding; these estimates that we have are never binding.
Q. I didn't ask you for that. The Court will endeavor to determine that question. I am asking you whether or not you sent
out your offer or proposal or option or letter, whatever you
want to call it, with the impression that the general contractors
would use it?

A. I was hoping that I would get a chance to get the job.
That was the purpose of the letter.
Q. Won't you just answer the question? Did you or did you
not intend that the general contractors should use it?
A. That is not for me to determine. That is for the contractor to decide, which is the low bid.
The Court: What is the use of fencing, Mr. Grotz? Can't you
tell me whether or not you expected or hoped that a general
contractor would base his bid for the entire job, in part at least,
upon your bid for the linoleum? '
The Witness: That is the purpose of our estimate.
125. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 37, at 32. To facilitate comparing
Hand and Moore, see Moore on the following subjects. On indifference: "[the subcontractor] had nothing to gain by plaintiff's submission of its own bid to the State," id. at
12; "the defendant had nothing to gain by the plaintiff submitting its own bid ...
" id.

at 25; "[d]efendant was not bargaining for, nor did it make any difference to it,
whether plaintiff submitted its bid ... " id. at 32. On protection: "Sufficient safeguards

are afforded by the law at the present time to protect an offeree who desires to secure
an irrevocable option upon which he may justifiably rely; he may pay consideration for
it ... " id. at 25. There is also brief mention of the seal, see id. at 10, and mutuality, see

id.
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The Court It is with that purpose that you sent the estimate,

that a contractor would use your figure in computing his figure, wasn't that so?
The Witness: That is the hope, surely.
The Court: That is what you sent it out for, wasn't it?
The Witness: That is the hope.
Q. Mr. Grotz, you sent out 24 letters with no other hope in
mind nor not any other intention. There is no dispute about
that, is there?
A. There is no dispute about that.126
The lesson that Moore seemed to draw from the dialogue for
purposes of legal argument was that the subcontractor did not
care about bids, only about the result of bids, i.e. whether it was
awarded the contract. It was completely within the discretion of
the general contractor to do what it wished; it was only going to
select one low bid. Therefore, the conclusion that Moore drew,
which attracted Hand's attention, was that the subcontractors
had nothing to gain from general contractors submitting bids
that included subcontractors' bids, or that it did not make any
difference to the subcontractor that the general contractor was
"submitting its own bid." 127 Just how a subcontractor could be
awarded work without first submitting a bid to a general contractor was not explained. What Moore and Hand apparently meant
was that the subcontractors were interested only in bargains (perhaps even bargains about how to use or interpret bids), not just
bids. However, how a subcontractor could get to a bargain without a bid was not spelled out. The term "indifference," therefore, probably had a very limited meaning.
What Hand must have meant by the term "indifference" was
that the subcontractor was indifferent legally, or as a matter of
law, about whether the general contractor used the subcontractor's bid, particularly if the general contractor's use of the bid
was not treated as an acceptance. The general contractor's use of
the bid had no legal consequences, setting the scene for an effective revocation prior to acceptance. If the general contractor
wished to change the legal character of the offer from revocable
to irrevocable, it was free to do so within the standing rules. The
subcontractor could go from being "indifferent" to being "interested," and technically obligated, if a bargain was created on the
subject, or if the general contractor accepted the offer. Only con126. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 108-09.
127. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 37, at 12, 25, 32.
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sideration automatically transformed the subcontractor from indifferent to interested and permitted the general contractor to
rely on the subcontractor's bid. The general contractor could
protect itself if it wished; if it did not, the formal rules operated
ruthlessly.
It is hard to believe that, as a sophisticated and subtle observer
of the way the world works, Hand could have concluded that the
subcontractor was indifferent economically to whether the general contractor used the subcontractor's bid in bidding on the
total project. Obviously the firms were not directly linked economically. They were separate firms with separate assets and were
not financially "interested" in one another. In a common-sense
way, is the subcontractor not just a tiny bit curious about
whether the winning bid by the general contractor contained the
subcontractor's bid? This curiosity, however, did not affect the legal result unless the general contractor acted to change the subcontractor's indifference to a bargain through consideration and,
thereby, transformed indifference into a legal commitment. The
parties became interested in each other only when they reached
a bargain signifying that they had legal rights against each other
that could be enforced in the event of breach. Then, the parties
were protected, but only then. Furthermore, the categorical imperative that promissory estoppel did not belong in the commercial setting guaranteed that precommitment factors, like reliance,
would not change the legal relationship. In justifying the result
in Baird, Hand maintained his vision of freedom of contract. He
would not force commercial actors into agreemehts that they did
not wish to enter. The rules of offer and acceptance compelled
that result. The autonomy and freedom of the parties were paramount. Until a party indicated a desire to limit its freedom by
entering into a bargain, it would be protected from unwanted
entanglements. When a party was ready to commit, the law
would ratify its decision; nothing less certain would suffice. Everyone knew the rules; judges and lawyers should not try to evade
them by distorting everyday understandings and meanings. If a
party wanted something else, it could abide by the formalities,
and the courts would enforce that choice. Individuals in the domain of contract law demanded no less respect.
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The Path to Drennan

The Trial and the Intermediate Appellate Court

Little is known about the trial in Drennan v. Star Paving.It took
place in the Superior Court of Kern County, north of Los Angeles. The case was tried on behalf of the general contractor by a
solo practitioner from Bakersfield and on behalf of the subcontractor by an associate in a two-member firm in Van Nuys. The
trial judge entered judgment for the general contractor. Among
the trial court's findings was that the subcontractor "made a definite and specific offer or bid to perform" the paving work, that
the subcontractor's "manner and method of submitting its bid to
plaintiff was in accordance with the usual and accepted customs
and practices of the local contracting and construction business,"
and "[t]hat in reliance upon [the subcontractor's bid], plaintiff
computed his final figures ... and submitted his bid ... specifically naming . . . the subcontractor selected by him to perform

said asphaltic paving work." 128 There is not a single mention of
the general contractor's formal acceptance of the subcontractor's
offer.
The subcontractor's brief to the District Court of Appeals is
merely ten triple-spaced pages, half of which are devoted to reprinting the trial judge's findings. Most of the argument is focused on the "position that there never was a firm bid given to
the plaintiff."129 Because there was no bid, "the basic question of
formation of a contract arises." 30 The brief was confused and unfocused, and the word "reliance" was not used once, nor was the
term "promissory estoppel" employed. I suppose that choice is
understandable if the strategy was simply to emphasize that no
offer was ever made so that no formation was possible. On the
other hand, promissory estoppel was the winning theory of liability in the case as established by the trial judge's findings; therefore, it probably would not have been a bad idea to at least mention it.
128. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, 4, Drennan v. Star Paving, 323 P.2d 477 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (No. 5642). All of the trial court's findings are listed in the appellant's brief. For reference to the general contractor's attorney, S.B. Gill, see 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECrORY 80 (1958). For reference to the subcontractor's attorney,

Earl J. McDowell, see id. at 515.
129. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 128, at 7. Indeed, part of this argument,
later dropped, was the absurd proposition that no bid was ever actually placed on the
telephone. See id. at 6.
130. Id. at 8.
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The general contractor's reply brief was considerably more sophisticated and, of course, paid substantial attention to promissory estoppel. The general contractor summarized the subcontractor's argument as merely stating "that there is no
131
consideration given for the promise" of the subcontractor.
"For the sake of this argument," responded the general contractor, "we will agree that consideration for Appellant's promise or
bid in the prosaic sense is non-existent here. Nevertheless that
fact is not fatal to Respondent's action."1 3 2 In other words, it was
going to be promissory estoppel, all or nothing. Further, emphasizing that theory was not a fatal strategic move because of the
significance of section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts.
As a general proposition, a subcontractor knows of the general
contractor's desire to place a bid .... and will promise or bid
to do such specified work for the general contractor . . . , and
the general contractor relies upon the promise or bid of the
subcontractors in submitting his bid to the awarding authority
133

This process "is the basic cornerstone of all bidding in the construction business today." 134 "[I] t would be unjust and unfair," after the general contractor has been awarded the prime contract,
"to allow the subcontractors to then retract their promises or
bids and permit the injustice and effect of such retraction to fall
upon the general contractor." 135 The general contractor maintained that promissory estoppel ought to be applied in this situation "for the benefit and protection of the party who relies upon
another's promise to his detriment, such as did the Respondent
1 36
general contractor in the instant case.
Furthermore, public policy supported the use of promissory estoppel. The public works bidding process, regulated by state law,
"protects the general public" against "irresponsible and unquali13 7
fied" firms.
If the subcontractors could withdraw their bids or refuse to perform with impunity after the acceptance of their general contractors' bids, the net result would be uncertain and irresponsi131. Respondent's Reply Brief at 8, Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 323 P.2d 477 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958)(Civ. No. 5642).
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id. at 10-11.
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 13.
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ble work and increased costs, to the detriment and injury of
the general public, all of which is opposed to public policy and
1 38
ordinary common sense.
If promissory estoppel was not applied, "a chaotic state would
exist in all public and private construction work in California,
and no one could be sure of any fixed bid for such work, to the
obvious detriment of the general public." 13 9 Obviously the economic assumptions underlying the general contractor's brief
were different from Hand's view of the problem in Baird.California was in the middle of a building boom and, so the argument
went, not recognizing reasonable reliance on bids would lead to
chaos. Yet, it was a chaos ratified by Hand in the autonomy of individual actors free to do what they wanted unless they protected
themselves. Ironically, the general contractor's brief in California
asserted implicitly that Hand's model, with its emphasis on individual conduct, did not allow for rational economic planning because each individual actor was free to go their own way. Hand's
particular set of certain and predictable offer and acceptance
rules promoted "chaos." A modern certain and predictable rule
was needed to insure order. Oddly enough, however, neither
brief at this stage cited or discussed Baird.
Neither did the opinion of the California District Court of Appeals in affirming the superior court's judgment. The district
court briefly examined the trial court findings that "a definite
and specific offer or bid" had been made and that, "in reliance
upon . . . the bid, plaintiff computed" and "submitted" his own
bid, and the court held that they were "supported by substantial
evidence" and could not be disturbed. 14° The court went on in a
cursory fashion to conclude, after examining two cases, that
promissory estoppel was recognized in California and that the
doctrine was "applicable under the facts .and circumstances

shown by the record herein." 141 No other discussion or elaboration occurred-no mention of the revocability of offers, the suitability of promissory estoppel, or the implications of the outcome on bidding practices in the construction industry.

138. Id. at 13-14.
139. Id. at 14.
140. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 323 P.2d 477, 479 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), vacated, 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
141. Id.
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The Petition and Reply for a Hearing in the Supreme Court

In its petition for a hearing in the California Supreme Court,
the subcontractor listed a number of important questions that
needed to be settled. The very first question, according to the
subcontractor's new appellate attorney, was "Is this a case of
breach of contract, or does the doctrine, of promissory estoppel
apply?"142 "It is the defendant's contention," argued the petition,
"that the question at issue was not the question of promissory estoppel," as framed by the district court, "but that the primary
and probably sole issue was whether a contract was made between the parties as a result of the alleged bid by the defendant,
and the plaintiffs actions thereafter." 143 No contract could have

been made because the general contractor selected the subcontractor's bid without the subcontractor's knowledge, and therefore, the subcontractor had revoked the bid before the subcontractor even knew that its bid had been used by the general
contractor. The conventional rules of offer and acceptance dictated that an offer may be revoked prior to acceptance. 144 The issue that the petition urged on the supreme court was whether a
contract could have been formed under the conventional rules
and, if not, could promissory estoppel somehow overcome an
otherwise effective revocation.
The general contractor's short reply to the petition urged its
denial on the grounds that the district court had "properly affirmed" the general contractor's promissory estoppel "theory of
the case" and applied the theory correctly to the facts. In addition, there were no unsettled questions of law worthy of the supreme court's exercise of discretion for review. 145 Concerning the
settled nature of the law, the general contractor placed primary
emphasis on exactly one case, a case it had cited in its brief to
the district court, 1" a case not from California, but a 1943 case
from the South Dakota Supreme Court, Northwestern Engineering
Co. v. Ellerman.1 47 The reply to the petition pointed out that the
142. Petition for Hearing in the Supreme Court After Decision in the District
Court of Appeal at 2, Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (Civ. No.
5642).
143.
144.
145.
Court at
146.
147.

Id. at 3.
See id. at 4-5.
See Respondent's Reply to Appellant's Petition for a Hearing by the Supreme
3, 4, Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (Civ. No. 5642).
See Respondent's Reply Brief, supra note 131, at 11.
10 N.W.2d 879 (S.D. 1943).
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South Dakota decision was "on all fours with the instant case." 148
The South Dakota decision was indeed a subcontractor/general
contractor bid case that applied promissory estoppel to its facts.
However, more importantly, it contained a rejection of the rea149
soning in Baird v. Gimbel "despite the eminence of its author."
The Baird case had yet to surface in any of the papers filed in
the litigation, which is particularly surprising given the subcontractor's legal position in the case. However, that changed soon
after the California Supreme Court granted the petition for a
hearing.
c.

The Appellate Briefs

At the California Supreme Court level, the subcontractor's attorney suddenly shifted gears when he realized he had a "mistake" case on his hands. The attorney devoted about half of the
argument in the brief to the mistaken bid and its legal consequences. Not until the very end of the brief did the attorney revisit the issue of promissory estoppel, urging that it was not applicable to the facts of the case.150 The general contractor
seemed "to base his entire theory of his right to recover on this
proposition: [t]hat even though no bilateral or enforceable contract was made, the appellant should respond in damages under
the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel.' "151
The subcontractor's position was simple-promissory estoppel
did not apply because it is confined to cases of donative intent;
in which one "does not expect to receive an equivalent consideration in return" and in which it "would shock the moral conscience, to permit the moral promisor to refuse to carry out his
promise." 152 On the other hand, "where an offer is made in expectation of a consideration it becomes merely a matter of offer
and acceptance, and the well-known doctrine that an offer can
be revoked before acceptance is made known, would apply." 53 If,
at this point, the subcontractor's brief had cited Baird v. Gimbel
for that proposition, everything would have appeared correct. Instead, the Baird citation followed the next troubling sentence:
148. Respondent's Reply to Appellant's Petition, supra note 145, at 5.
149. E/erman, 10 N.W.2d at 883.
150. See Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 19, Drennan v. Star Paving, 333 P.2d 757
(Cal. 1958) (No. LA 25054).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id at 20.
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"In such case also, an offer made through mistake or error can
be rescinded even after acceptance. 15 4 Although it probably
made no difference in the long run, this was a misstatement of
the holding in Baird (and a little reminiscent of how the parties
misused the facts and holding in Allegheny College in the Baird
briefs). Maybe it was just a careless reading or an overstatement
made by a zealous advocate. However, it did create confusion
and left the impression that the revocation in Baird occurred after acceptance had taken place. If that was true, when was there
an acceptance that formed a bilateral agreement in Baird?.Was
the acceptance the use of the bid, as was argued by the general
contractor in Baird? It could not be that, in Baird, a revocation
occurred after any other type of acceptance because clearly a revocation was received before a. formal acceptance. The subcontractor's brief did not help its case.
The general contractor's reply brief began by noting that the
defense of mistake had been raised for the first time in the subcontractor's brief on appeal. It claimed that, because the defense
was only being raised at this late stage, it should not be considered now. 155 Most of the rest of the reply brief was devoted to an
elaboration of promissory estoppel doctrine and an explication
of its applicability to the case.
The subcontractor's bid "caused Respondent to rely on the bid
in submitting his final and irrevocable" bid to the public authorities. "There is no question" that the subcontractor could have
withdrawn the bid before the general contractor used it, "but its
attempt to withdraw was subsequent to Respondent's irrevocable
change of position" and the awarding of the project to the general contractor.156 If the subcontractor's position prevailed, injustice would result, fair play would be denied, and losses would be
"force[d] down the throat of every general contractor." In addition, "a pad for 'rescission insurance' " would be added to bids,
presumably to protect profit margins and to spread the costs of
whatever posted bonds might be forfeited. "Chaos," argued the
general contractor, would reign "throughout the construction industry in California today, [and the court] should be well aware
of the fact that the major portion of heavy construction in the

154. Id.

155. See Respondent's Reply to Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 5, Drennan v. Star
Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958)(Civ. No. 5642).
156. Id. at 6.

19971

CONTRACT LAW

1209

State of California today consists of public works projects." 15 7 The
general contractor maintained that the solution was to apply
promissory estoppel.
"In California," the general contractor remarked, "our Courts
have assumed leadership in the development of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel." 15 8 The reply brief spelled out the elements
of a promissory estoppel claim under section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts and demonstrated how the elements were satisfied. The argument was that "[e]stoppel is a proper substitute
for consideration" when the subcontractor promises "to do specified work . . .with knowledge" that the general contractor in-

tends to bid on a job and "where the promise or bid is relied
upon by the general contractor in submitting his bid to a public
body, which bid is accepted." 159 Furthermore, "[i]n the field of
general construction work where bidding is highly competitive,
subcontractors invariably expect their bids (however communicated) to be relied upon by the general contractor and acted
upon by him." 16° In other words, subcontractors know or understand (for whatever reason-right or wrong, vulnerable or not,
equal or not) that the business operates in this way, and the law
ought to recognize that practice.
Having vigorously defended the appropriateness of promissory
estoppel in the case, the reply brief ended by devoting almost
two pages to distinguishing Baird v. GimbeL The attempt to distinguish Baird was garbled factually and contained an inaccurate
statement that could have weakened the general contractor's
chances in Drennan-that, in Baird, the general contractor had
time after receiving notice of the revocation to submit a new bid
on the overall project.161 However, regardless of the result in
Baird, the reply brief stressed that Baird "has been severely criticized in law review articles . . . and was not accepted" in the

South Dakota case cited in the general contractor's briefs.1 62
Most significantly, "in 1933, when the Baird decision was rendered, the construction industry was not the basic backbone of
our economy that it is today." 63 Of course, that suggested that
the Baird rule was outdated and not currently functional-a gen157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11-12.
See idat 16.
I& at 17.
Id.
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eral theme that, as we will learn shortly, was of some interest to
Traynor.
Just in case, however, the general contractor appended to its
brief a cautious alternative to the promissory estoppel analysis.
The general contractor accepted the subcontractor's bid' 64 when
it appeared the next morning at the subcontractor's office. However, unlike the general contractor's argument in Baird, the contention here was not that the use of the bid amounted to an acceptance. The general contractor, according to this argument,
had accepted the offer when it told the subcontractor face-toface that it had been awarded the primary contract. Either a bilateral contract or promissory estoppel obligated the subcontractor, but the overall argument was keyed to promissory estoppel.
The general contractor's brief quickly returned to the Ellerman
case for a final quotation and exhortation on the rationality of
adopting promissory estoppel in subcontractor/general contractor bidding situations.165 The California Supreme Court accepted
the invitation both to apply the analysis and to use the quotation, but only after an almost perfunctory oral argument.
d.

The Oral Argumentt 6

The opinion of the court was not affected by oral argument.
In fact, it seemed to contribute nothing of significance to Traynor's eventual opinion. In 1958, the California Supreme Court allocated thirty minutes per party for oral arguments. 67 The fourteen and one-half page transcript of the argument would lead
one to believe that the argument consumed a total of only thirty
minutes, rather than the full hour to which the parties were entitled. Almost two-thirds of the argument was devoted to the subcontractor's opening presentation and rebuttal, but the general
contractor's argument accounted for only one-third of the time.
The justices' participation in the argument was distinguished by
their silence. Only Chief Justice Gibson asked any questions, and
almost all of them were directed towards the subcontractorprobably a bad sign for their position. Once the general contrac164. See id.
165. See id. at 18.
166. During this period of the California Supreme Court, a court reporter's
transcript was made of each oral argument before the court. The arguments might
prove to be a useful, untapped source for legal historians. Some transcripts may be
found in the individual case files housed in the California State Archives in Sacramento.
167. Cal. R. App. 22(1), in 36 Cal.2d 20 (1951).
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tor's argument began, Gibson interrupted only once with a question. Traynor did not say a word. Chief Justice Gibson asked a total of only nine questions and seemed primarily concerned, even
a little impatient, with moving the argument along.
Appellants, of course, carry special burdens in arguing for reversal. Even so, the subcontractor's attorney, Norman Soibelman,
should have been alarmed at the inauspicious way his argument
began when Chief Justice Gibson badgered him and boxed him
into an appellate comer. The introductory dialogue provided the
only sparks in the oral argument and revealed that the Chief Justice, if not his colleagues, had already made up his mind. He
seemed to suggest that this was an open and shut reliance case,
as the subcontractor's lawyer desperately tried to fend off the
conclusion.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The trial court found that there was a definite bid to perform the job. Is there substantial evidence to
support that finding?
MR. SOIBELMAN: There was contradictory evidence, if your

Honor please.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: If there was substantial evidence to sup-

port the finding you are bound by it, and there is the further
fact that there was reliance upon the bid.
MR. SOIBELMAN: We have to go further than, that, if your

Honor please. Reliance itself is not sufficient.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Why not?

MR. SOIBELMAN: As I see it, there has to be something more
than that. There has to be damages. There has to be a right to
rely on.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Well, a man makes a bid and says, "I will
do this job for so much money," and the contractor says, "All
right, I accept your bid." In reliance upon that bid he proceeds
with the work. Why hasn't he a right to rely upon that definite
bid?
MR SOIBELMAN: If your Honor please, at that moment he has
a right to rely on it.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: All right.
MR. SOIBELMAN: But then there comes a time when it is
shown that that bid was a bid made in error. Then we have
something more than the rule of law to apply. We have the rule
of equity . . . the rule of rescission, the right to rescind by reason of mistake .... 6

168. Reporter's Transcript of Oral Argument at 1-3, Drennan v. Star Paving, 333
P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958)(No. L.A. 25054) (September 30, 1958).
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Quickly seeking to alter the focus after this ominous, opening
flurry, Soibelman tried to deflect the reliance argument by retreating to a position that framed the case as a common biddingmistake situation that fit into standard equitable rescission categories, a position raised for the first time in the brief he filed
with the supreme court.1 69 "With respect to reliance and the doctrine of promissory estoppel, . ..it would be unconscionable to
enforce what would be the rule of law, rather than the rule of
equity."1 70 The court had to select between "two conflicting or
two equal, well-established rules of equity involved in this case,
one the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the other the equitable doctrine of rescission." 171 But the argument focused on the
grounds for rescission for mistake, generally ignoring the assertion of liability under promissory estoppel terms. Thus, the subcontractor strategically pinned its hopes on a rescission theory
and ignored the facts that did not support the legal elements of
a promissory estoppel claim.
Drennan's lawyer, S.B. Gill, immediately sensed the weakness
in his opponent's argument and took advantage of it by cleverly
emphasizing the appellate court's limited role. "We started out in
the trial court," he reminded the justices, "with the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as our basis for recovery. We stuck to that
point before the District Court of Appeal, and the point of rescission was never raised in the pleadings or before the District
1 72
Court of Appeal."
The rest of the general contractor's argument amounted to approximately a ten minute, uninterrupted soliloquy. Abruptly rejecting the factual and legal foundation and the pretension of
the rescission cases, Gill promptly redirected the court's attention to promissory estoppel:
[T]his Court has taken as the basis for promissory estoppel,
both theories of contract and theories of tort, and they are justified in either situation, but it all boils down to this. The name
of promissory estoppel is new. The application at the present
169. See id. at 3-8; see also supra text accompanying note 150.
170. Reporter's Transcript, supra note 168, at 4.
171. Id. at 5. The Chief Justice asked Soibelman if he thought that the rules in California rescission cases like M.E Kerper Constr Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 235 P.2d 7
(1951), applied to the facts in the Drennan case. See Reporter's Transcript, supra note
168, at 5. In his opinion, Traynor disposed of the relevance of the line of California rescission cases, beginning with Kemper, in precisely one sentence. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 761 (Cal. 1958).
172. Reporter's Transcript, supra note 168, at 9.
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173

Why? "[B]ecause when we stop to think about it, a simple contract in the first instance was made in the basis of a reliance action and reliance upon the promises made by the promissor, and
not as it is today, a promise bought for consideration or a
174
price."
Gill concluded by echoing the policy refrains drawn from his
appellate brief. "We have to go beyond the matter of promissory
estoppel in this case also. There is a matter of vital policy involved," he implored.1 75 He further added:
[T]he heavy industry in this case is one of the basic backbones
of our economy. We didn't have the rescession [sic] in California that we had through the rest of the country because of the
success of our building industry, and we are coming out of it
faster because of the stability in the industry. 176
That stability would be threatened if general contractors could
not rely on subcontractors' bids. "The tax payers of the State of
California would suffer from interminable delays. The price of
construction would go up radically if this were permitted in this
177
type of situation."
The entire argument on both sides concluded without a single
mention of Hand's opinion in Baird.Virtually nothing in the oral

argument would find its way into Traynor's opinion. The attor-

neys were not much help, and if Traynor was to develop the law
of promissory estoppel on this subject, he would have to do it
himself.
e.

The Traynor Opinion in Drennan

Justice Traynor began his opinion in Drennan v. Star Paving by
summarizing the interactions between the parties and the trial
court's resolution of those events. He introduced his analysis by
relating the subcontractor's' argument "that there was no enforceable contract betveen the parties on the ground that it
made a revocable offer and revoked it before plaintiff communi-

173. Reporter's Transcript, supra note 168, at 11-12.
174. Id. at 12.
175. Id.

176. Id. at 13.
177. Id.
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cated his acceptance to defendant"18 ---a position entirely compatible with Baird v. Gimbe4 however, the case is not mentioned
at this point in the opinion. Traynor determined that "[t]here is
no evidence that defendant offered to make its bid irrevocable
in exchange for plaintiff's use of its figures in computing his bid.
Nor is there evidence that would warrant interpreting plaintiff's
use of defendant's bid as the acceptance . "..."179
In other words,
the result, as enunciated so far, was consistent with the outcome
in Baird, accepting the premises of the formal system of offer
and acceptance. Like Hand, Traynor found "neither an option
supported by consideration nor a bilateral contract binding on
both parties. 180 Traynor disposed of the arguments that were
based on the traditional application of the rules of offer and acceptance in one short paragraph. All that remained now was the
general contractor's contention "that he relied to his detriment
on defendant's offer . . . . Thus the question is squarely
presented: Did plaintiff's reliance make defendant's offer
81
irrevocable?"
Traynor's answer to the question began by quoting section 90
of the Restatement of Contracts in full and by observing that
"this rule applies in this state." 82 He then analyzed whether the
elements required for a promissory estoppel claim under Section
90 were satisfied. "Defendant's offer constituted a promise to
perform on such conditions," either stated expressly, implied, or
by operation of law, and "[d]efendant had reason to expect that
if its bid proved the lowest it would be used by plaintiff," and
defendant induced the plaintiff's definite and substantial
83
action.1
What about the legal relationship between the subcontractor's
bid or offer and rules governing revocation? "Had defendant's
bid expressly stated or clearly implied that it was revocable at any
time before acceptance we would treat it accordingly. It was si-

178. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Section 90 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts reads: "A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." RESTATEMENT OF CoNTcrs § 90 (1932).
183. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759.
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lent on revocation," 114 and therefore, the task in this case was to
determine whether a limitation on the right to revoke might be
derived by the operation of law or inferred from the circumstances. For assistance in answering this question about bilateral
184. Id. It is unclear why the offer's silence on revocation matters because one
could presume that the operation of legal rules on revocability would provide a good indication of the intention of the parties. In other words, why not assume that in the absence of any mention of the subject, the parties assume that the existing legal rules apply? However, Traynor seems to treat the absence of formal terms or discussion on the
subject as an invitation to determine what the real intent of the parties must have been.
The logic seems to go something like this: If the subcontractor is the master of the offer, the master can indicate any terms in its offer that it so chooses. If the master says
nothing in its offer about revocation, how do we know that it meant to incorporate in
its offer generally applied norms of revocation that we assume it knows, understands,
agrees with, or wishes to apply to this transaction? We should be able to look elsewhere
to figure out what the intent of the offeror might be in the absence of any direct communication on the subject. This predilection for moving beyond or overlooking the presumptive operative effects of legal rules to the "real intent" of the parties is more than
a little reminiscent of Traynor's approach to the parol evidence rule. In the well-known
case of Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 565 (Cal. 1958), he employed the "silence" strategy to avoid the restrictive operation of the parol evidence rule. "The option clause in
the deed in the present case does not explicitly provide that it contains the complete
agreement, and the deed is silent on the question of assignability." Id. at 565. Normal
legal assumptions about assignability might apply in the face of the failure to mention
the subject, but then how can we be sure we are interpreting the contract in the way
the parties intended? A modern discussion of the problem might focus on default rules.
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules
for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. (1990). The point seems to be to reject the
formalistic overtones of the application of the rule and to set to sea in search of the
subjectivity that words or their absence might inadequately express. It could be Corbinism run rampant, and its effect might be the practical obliteration of the parol evidence
rule already riddled or eaten up by exceptions. On the other hand, it may actually reveal the true intentions of the parties as opposed to frustrating the pursuit of that intention occasionally when the rule is strictly applied. For approval of Traynor's approach,
see W. Richard West, Jr., Note, ChiefJustice Traynorand the ParolEvidence Rule, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 547 (1970). For criticism of one aspect of the approach (as exemplified in Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (1968)), see the
opinion of Judge Kozinski in Tident Ctr v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564
(9th Cir. 1988), particularly his charge that Traynor's approach "chips away at the foundation of our legal system." Id. at 569. For a less alarmed evaluation of Traynor's views
by a different Ninth Circuit panel implicitly chastising Kozinski's rhetoric, see A. Kemp
Fisheries, Inc. v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 852 F.2d 493, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1988). Believe it or
not, the Wall Street Journalchimed in on the debate on the occasion of Kozinski's opinion, praising the good judge, and criticizing Traynor. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Rescuing
Contracts From High Weirdness, WALL ST. J., August 3, 1988, at 18. I feel safer at night
knowing that someone in the Wall Street Journal is reading Federal Reporter advance
sheets or, better yet, that there is a fully functioning public relations office hidden
somewhere in the recesses of the Ninth Circuit. For a more sanguine analysis than
Judge Kozinski's of the fate of the parol evidence rule in California, see Susan J. MartinDavidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There Is a ParolEvidence Rule in California-TheLessons of a
Pyrrhic Victory, 25 Sw. U. L REv. 1 (1995).
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contracts, Traynor looked by analogy at the rules governing the
formation of unilateral contracts.
In the world of unilateral contracts, Traynor noted that "the
theory is now obsolete that the offer is revocable at any time
before complete performance." 185 Section 45 of the first Restatement of Contracts had changed that, and Traynor quoted the
rule that altered what generations of law students had endured
as the "climbing the flagpole" or "crossing the Brooklyn Bridge"
hypothetical. If the offeror had promised to pay the offeree one
hundred dollars for climbing the flagpole, under unilateral contract rules, a contract would not be formed until the performance-reaching the top of the flagpole-had been completed.
Therefore, the offeror had the right to revoke the offer even
though the offeree had started performance and was halfway up
the flagpole. Section 45 changed the rule, and according to one
of the comments to section 45, it changed it because "[t]he
main offer includes as a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied,
that if part of the requested performance is given, the offeror
will not revoke his offer ... [p]art performance or tender may
thus furnish consideration for the subsidiary promises."18 6 The
comment also suggested that "merely acting in justifiable reliance on an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient reason for
making a promise binding (see § 90)."187
Traynor noted that, in the unilateral contract situation, the implied subsidiary promise precluded the "injustice" of allowing
revocation after someone had started performance in reliance on
the promise, i.e. venturing halfway up the flagpole. He also concluded that the analogy could be applied in the bilateral context,
as well as in the unilateral context. "Reasonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change in position affords a compelling basis also for implying a subsidiary promise not to revoke
an offer for a bilateral contract. 188
The analogy only partially worked. In the bilateral contract setting, Traynor asserted that "the absence of consideration is not
fatal to the enforcement of such" an implied subsidiary promise
185. Drennan,333 P2d at 759.
186. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 45 cmt. b (1932). For the flagpole, see Karl Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 YALE LJ. 1, 32 (1938). For
the Brooklyn Bridge, see I. Maurice Wormser, The The Conception of UnilateralContracts,

26 YALE LJ. 136 (1916). Wormser eventually changed his mind. See I. Maurice Wormser,
Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 146 (1950).
187. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 186.

188. Drennan,333 P.2d at 760.
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not to revoke. 189 The unilateral contract promise not to revoke

hinged on an implied mini-bargain or exchange supported by
consideration-tendering of part performance produced a promise not to revoke. However, Traynor argued that the reference in
comment b of section 45 to section 90 "makes clear that consideration for such a promise is not always necessary. The very purpose of section 90 is to make a promise binding even though
there was no consideration 'in the sense of something that is
bargained for and given in exchange.' "190 Although revocation
rules in the unilateral contract situation conformed to the bargain theory of consideration, consideration under the bargain
theory was missing in bilateral contexts that had only the reliance of one of the parties to show for it. Traynor's conclusion,
therefore, was that "[r]easonable reliance serves to hold the offeror in lieu of the consideration ordinarily required to make
the offer binding." 191 Traynor engaged in a very subtle, and
somewhat thinly veiled, attack on consideration as a required element in all bilateral contracts.
Traynor suggested that, in a commercial context, there might
be alternative reasons for enforcing agreements that lacked consideration. The justification for this form of analysis came from a
sister supreme court-South Dakota in the Ellerman case. Traynor
employed a fuller version of the quotation from the case that
had closed the general contractor's brief. The Ellerman court had
written that, in enforcing promissory estoppel in the bidding
process, "[w]e cannot believe that by accepting this doctrine as
controlling in the state of facts before us we will abolish the requirement of a consideration in contract cases, in any different
sense than an ordinary estoppel abolishes some legal requirement in its application."1 92 The passage quoted by Traynor from
the South Dakota case focused on the fact that the promise, unsupported by consideration, ought to be enforced anyway because the subcontractor "should have reasonably expected [that
it] would [have induced] the plaintiff to submit a bid based
thereon to the Government, that such promise did induce this
action, and that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
189. Id. Traynor's use of the word "fatal" may have been drawn from the discussion
of consideration in the general contractor's brief in the district court. See supra text accompanying note 132.
190. Drhnnan, 333 P.2d at 760 (quoting 1 CORIN, Cor'miAcrs 634 et seq.).
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Northwestern Eng'g Co. v. Ellerman, 10 N.W.2d 879, 884 (S.D.

1943)).
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the promise." 193 The quotation and its cite to Ellerman is followed
by a very quiet, lonely citation-some have commented on its
"coyness"'9--cf. Baird v. GimbeLt 95 Traynor seemed to suggest
that
Baird offered an alternative analysis although he refused to follow its model.
The rationale for adopting promissory estoppel follows almost
as an attempt to explain why injustice can be avoided only by applying the doctrine to these circumstances. It is worth quoting
extensively because it is the most crucial part of the opinion, revealing how Traynor viewed the relationship between the parties
and because it is the part of the opinion in which Traynor most
thoroughly rejected Hand's view of the legal problem. Selfconsciously, Traynor contrasted his approach to Hand's.
When plaintiff used defendant's offer in computing his own
bid, he bound himself to perform in reliance on defendant's
terms. Though defendant did not bargain for this use of its bid
neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent to whether it
would be used or not. On the contrary it is reasonable to suppose that defendant submitted its bid to obtain the subcontract.
It was bound to realize the substantial possibility that its bid
would be the lowest, and that it would be included by plaintiff
in his bid. It was to its own interest that the contractor be
awarded the general contract; the lower the subcontractor bid,
the lower the general contractor's bid was likely to be and the
greater its chance of acceptance and hence the greater defendant's chance of getting the paving subcontract. Defendant had
reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely on its bid but to want
him to. Clearly defendant had a stake in plaintiff's reliance on
its bid. Given this interest and the fact that plaintiff is bound by
his own bid, it is only fair that plaintiff should have at least an
opportunity to accept defendant's bid after the general contract
has been awarded to him.'%
From Traynor's point of view, therefore, Hand had missed the
point. Just because a formal bargain had not existed on the subject of using the subcontractor's bid did not mean that the sub-

193. Id.
194. KNAPP & CRYSTAL,

supra note 3, at 239.

195. See Drennan, 333 E2d at 760.
196. Id. Traynor's point in this paragraph is a little reminiscent of the colloquy between attorney, judge, and witness at the Baird trial on the subcontractor's expectactions
and reasons for entering the bid process. it is, of course, highly unlikely that Traynor
had access to the Baird trial transcript. Instead, he seems to be employing his intuitive
sense of the subcontractor's motivation. For comparison to the Baird trial, see supra text
accompanying note 126.
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contractor was not involved in a web of understandings about
the bid or was indifferent to its use. That offered too atomistic a
view of the world. Instead, Traynor stressed a combination of two
ideas. First, the subcontractor was interested in having a general
contractor use its bid, particularly a winning general contractor,
because its fate was tied up with the fate of the general contractor-low bids on parts of the project aggregated to low bids on
the complete project. The subcontractor "had a stake in plaintiff's reliance on the bid." Second, it was in the self-interest of
the subcontractor for the bid to be used and for the general
contractor to be awarded the contract. Practical, hard-headed,
reasons existed to think of the interaction this way. These reasons were just as practical as the reasons that Hand thought concerned the formal rules of offer and acceptance. Self-interest was
reinforced by each party relying on the relationship. It was not
reinforced by sending the other party on his own way. Plaintiffs
reliance had made defendant's offer irrevocable.
Traynor left a few loose ends to be tied up in the rest of the
opinion. Technically, the general contractor may not be required
to hire the subcontractor after receiving the award for the overall project. Because the application of promissory estoppel gave
the general contractor an opportunity to accept the subcontractor's offer after being notified of the award of the general contract, the general contractor was "not free to delay acceptance
• ..in the hope of getting a better price" (perhaps elsewhere),
"or reopen bargaining with the subcontractor" (perhaps with the
hope of getting a lower price from the subcontractor anxious to
get the job).197 If the general contractor reopened bargaining, he
ran the risk of forfeiting the "continuing right to accept the
original offer."198 Otherwise, the subcontractor would be placed

in a vulnerable or unequal position, and Traynor tried to prevent
the problem of bid shopping. One party should not be allowed
to suffer at the expense of another just because promissory estoppel was the preferred solution.
197. Drennan,333 P.2d at 760.

198. Id. The scholarly literature is replete with discussions of whether allowing the
general contractor the right to shop around while binding the subcontractor is fair,
equal, or efficient. CompareJamesGordley, EnforcingPromises, 83 CAL.L. REv. 547, 612-13
(1995), with Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in
Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE LJ.1249, 1277-78 (1996); see also infra text accompanying notes 289-95. I am somewhat of an agnostic on the academic debate over which is
the "better" solution-Hand's or Traynor's. Rather, I prefer to focus on the historical
process by which Traynor arrived at his conclusion.
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The question of mistake remained. "If plaintiff had reason to
believe that defendant's bid was in error, he could not justifiably
rely on it, and section 90 would afford no basis for enforcing
it." 199 Traynor decided that the general contractor, "however, had
no reason to know that defendant had made a mistake in submitting its bid" 2°° because the subcontractor's bid fell within the
variance in bids for projects of that type in that locale. "Under
these circumstances defendant's mistake, far from relieving it of
its obligation, constitutes an additional reason for enforcing it,
for it misled plaintiff as to the cost of doing the paving." 2 1 The
subcontractor should have been more careful because it knew
that it was preparing bids that would be relied on by others.
"Moreover, it was motivated by its own business interest."" 2 The
subcontractor's error on these facts "should not defeat recovery
under the rule of section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. As
between the subcontractor who made the bid and the general
contractor who reasonably relied on it, the loss resulting from
the mistake should fall on the party who caused it."' 20 3 There
were no surviving impediments to applying promissory estoppel.
III. THE CASES COMPARED: TRAYNOR'S DIREcT RESPONSE TO HAND
There are a number of factors that would lead one to believe
that Traynor directly targeted Baird in Drennan, particularly elements such as structure, law, language, and ideology. Those elements, combined with Traynor's extrajudicial discussions of Drennan, as well as his general views on precedent and the evolving
nature of law, encourage one to think that the Drennan opinion
was more than a coincidence and was more likely an
opportunity.

199. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 761.
200. Id.

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. For a discussion about where the loss caused by mistake might fall, see ScoTr
& LESLIE, supra note 4, at 245. Traynor also dismissed the subcontractor's argument that
the cause of action ought to be dismissed for failure to allege an attempt to mitigate

damages, ruling instead that the general contractor "clearly ...acted reasonably to mitigate," and that the defendant had waived any objection to the pleadings on the subject
by not raising the issue by special demurrer. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 761.
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A. The InternalEvidence
1. The Structure of the Legal Rules
In the twenty-five years after Hand's decision in Baird, no
judge considered the legal categories discussed in Baird as seriously and carefully as Traynor did in Drennan.2° For logical and
organizational reasons, Traynor telescoped into one introductory
paragraph both Hand's rejection of the general contractor's bilateral contract formation argument (acceptance occurred when
the general contractor used the subcontractor's bid) and his rejection of the option contract analysis. 20 5 In effect, he streamlined what was, in his view, an unnecessary technical debate so
that he could proceed with the promissory estoppel analysis. This
strategy is particularly noteworthy because the general contractor
in Drennan never argued that the use of the bid was an 'acceptance or that an option had been created. Instead, it created a
fallback position that an acceptance prior to revocation had
taken place after the general contract had been awarded. 2°6 In
fact, in his careful summary of the parties' legal "contentions,"
Traynor never ascribed to them an argument about the bid as acceptance. Where else could Traynor have seen the argument
other than in Baird, and why bother to discuss it if the parties
had not raised the issue in Drennan?
After quickly disposing of the revocation analysis, Traynor addressed promissory estoppel in the same place and order in the
opinion that Hand did. However, Traynor spent no time at all
discussing whether the doctrine applied to commercial transactions-a theme that was still being discussed in one of the intervening cases cited by Traynor.m He simply ignored the problem,
explaining that promissory estoppel had been adopted in California and applying the doctrine to the facts of the case.

204. See, e.g., Northwestern Eng'g Co. v. Ellerman, 10 N.W.2d 879 (S.D. 1943); Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941); Albert v. Farnsworth
& Co., 176 E2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949).
205. See Drnnan, 333 P.2d at 759.
206. See Respondent's Reply Brief, supra note 155, at 17.
207. Robert Gordon, 117 F.2d at 661; see also Elerman, 10 N.W.2d at 883-84. For an important discussion of the evolution of promissory estoppel's applicability to bargain or
commercial transactions, see Henderson, supra note 7. For insights about where Baird
and Drennan fit in that evolution, see id. at 355-57.
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Language

The most striking example of the identical use of language is
the concept of "indifference." No other case uses the concept.
The phraseology is employed to describe the same event in both
opinions-the legal implications of the use of the subcontractor's
bid by the general contractor in submitting its bid. Hand argued
that the subcontractor's offer was to provide the linoleum only if
the general contractor formally accepted the offer, "not for its
bid, which was a matter of indifference to it." 208 When Traynor
examined the same event, he drew different conclusions, but
used the same language. "Though defendant did not bargain for
this use of its bid neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent
to whether it would be used or not."201 He continued to emphasize his disagreement with the indifference principle in the very
next sentence, beginning with the phrase "on the contrary":
"[o]n the contrary it is reasonable to suppose that defendant
210
submitted its bid to obtain the subcontract."

The paragraph in which Traynor discussed indifference immediately follows the citation of Baird at the end of the preceding
paragraph. The "cf." citation to Baird, at that point, served as an
invitation to compare the Baird approach on the use of promissory estoppel (i.e., rejecting it) with the quotation from the E/lerman case (i.e., adopting, defending, and applying it). However,
Traynor then took the occasion to accept his own invitation to
examine and to compare Baird with his own approach in Drennan. Traynor began with indifference because the appropriateness
of promissory estoppel in these circumstances hinges on its
implications.
The use of indifference, therefore, occurs in the same place in
both opinions-in the discussion about reasons for the rejection
or for the application of promissory estoppel. Hand used the
word in his paragraph that explained why promissory estoppel
should not be used in the commercial context. His point in invoking the concept was to support his belief that this was a conventional bargain and that no contract on the subject would be
found because, without a bargain about the use of the bid, the
subcontractor was indifferent about what the general contractor
did with the bid. Indifference is deployed as a strategy to ration208. Baird v. Gimbel, 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933).
209. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760.
210. Id.
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alize the rejection of promissory estoppel. Traynor likewise discussed indifference in the context of promissory estoppel. Indifference is an impediment to Traynor's analysis of promissory
estoppel, and he must explain its inaptness. Traynor's entire paragraph defending the use of promissory estoppel is a rejection of
the indifference principle. In its place, he suggested that a form
of commitment or obligation, through reliance, should be substituted for indifference. It is in the best interest of the subcontractor to pursue a commitment to the general contractor, and that
interest logically calls for legal recognition through promissory
estoppel.
3.

Ideology and Indifference

Hand's view of the case's resolution was driven by a particular
image of self-interest: people should understand that expressions
of self-reliance are the only recognized interests in contract law
applied to business obligations. "[I]t does not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who
do not protect themselves." 21 1 So protect yourself; be vigilant; do
not enter into bargains you do not wish to. The law's purpose
was to further this individualistic, atomistic conception of society
on the assumption that in the long run everyone benefited
under conditions of freedom that encouraged individual productivity and increased wealth. People were free to choose whether
to enter into transactions. When the particular legal rules governing a transaction were in question, the courts stood back and
let the parties tell them what to do. The courts will not force or
coerce people into going where they do not wish to go. Freedom
of contract also means the freedom not to contract, which must
be guarded closely for the very reason that an expression of the
freedom of contract involves a voluntary, consensual limitation of
that freedom. The reason you limit your freedom is because you
get something in return, you calculate that it is in your interestthat calculation is the central tenet in the explanation of the psychology motivating economic liberalism. A decision not to contract means that you do not choose to limit your freedom because you will not get, in your judgment, something sufficient in
return. Thus, judges attentive to issues of personal freedom,
need to be particularly careful about binding people in transac-

211. Baird, 64 F.2d at 346.
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tions they do not wish to enter. This was no world for softhearted paternalistic intervention.
The offer and acceptance rules about revocation are an example of the freedom of contract norms. Because people making
an offer are free to revoke the offer before acceptance, they have
the right to change their minds and to decide not to contract, or
not to limit their freedom in this instance. If individuals wish to
alter the presumptive operation of the rule and make revocable
offers into irrevocable offers, they need to use a clear sign of intention-consideration for the shift in legal entitlement. The
shift in rules may be purchased in some way that indicates a
choice to limit the freedom to revoke; it has been made worthwhile to the offeror to make the offer irrevocable. The actors are
presumed to be indifferent to anything short of that because it is
not signified or ratified by consideration. The subcontractor's
stance or proclamation is that, without consideration, it is indifferent. The subcontractor only gets interested in a formal, legal
way when its attention or stake is purchased. Protection is provided only to those who have behaved as rational actors in the
marketplace act-by asserting individual self-interest.
Traynor had a different idea about self-interest-one stemming
from the language of section 90 itself-what the reasonable expectations of the parties should be, given the nature of the transaction.212 However, one rule did not fit all situations. In his indifference paragraph, Traynor repeatedly invoked reasonable
expectations as an alternative to pure individualism-e.g., "[i]t is
reasonable to suppose"; " [i] t was bound to realize"; "it was to its
own interest"; "[d]efendant had reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely on its bid but to want him to." 213 Traynor was saying
to Hand in the language of Llewellyn-your "situation sense" is
all wrong. Traynor argued that these parties were not purely atomistic actors meeting randomly in the marketplace. Rather,
they were embedded in a relationship in the marketplace-a relationship they engaged in out of mutual self-interest. The subcontractor could not obtain the job unless the general contractor
212. The Restatement (First) of Contracts reads in part: "A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character...

."

RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1932) (emphasis added). For a

discussion of the origins of the reasonable expectations idea, see Catherine M.A. McCauliff, Reprise on a Classical Theme: Can Bargained-for-Exchange Theory Accommodate Promissory Estoppel?, (manuscript at 46 n.10) (on file with author); see alsoJohn H. Baker, From
Contract to Reasonable Expectation, 32 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 17 (1979).
213. Drennan,333 P.2d at 760.
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received the job. The use of the lowest bid helped both partieswhy would the subcontractor not hope that the general contractor used its bid if it was the lowest? It is the only way the subcontractor would get the work.
Traynor's response to Hand seems to be that reliance on
others can facilitate one's own interest or market behavior in an
increasingly interdependent, complex world. In his view, it is in
the subcontractor's own self-interest to have the general contractor rely on its bid. Traynor's model of economic activity in this
sphere posits a dialectical relationship between individual selfinterest and relational norms, between individualism and altruism. It is possible, I suppose, to conceive of capitalism in terms
of a type of altruism, where people just wish to be paid for services offered to each other that each might need, but cannot
provide for themselves. But I do not think that is what Traynor is
proposing. Traynor wants to adjust the market to modern realities. We sometimes need each bther to get what we want: Why
not recognize that reliance in law? From Traynor's vantage point,
Hand had a narrow, insufficient idea of what constituted selfinterest.
In addition, Traynor seems to suggest that the concept of reliance does not in any way violate freedom of contract and its attendant norm of individualism. Freedom of contract just requires
readjustment. The reasonable expectations of the parties seem
calculated to fit the remedy in this case within freedom of contract. Traynor says to Hand, in effect, that there is more than
one way to think about freedom of contract. How can freedom
of contract be undermined if the action of promissory estoppel
ends up giving the parties their reasonable expectations? Isn't
freedom of contract maintained by providing for the outcomes
that the parties expected? If the market participants believed the
process should work in a practical way in this manner, then freedom of contract is enhanced by meeting their needs. It is an expression of their freedom-an elaboration of their understanding. It turns out, after all, that the parties are protecting
themselves-as they get what they apparently want. Their reasonable expectations end up being protected.
B.

The External Evidence

The evidence that Traynor targeted Baird is supported by a
number of external factors. Traynor often went on the extrajudicial record about his attitudes toward social change, legal
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change, and precedent. 214 All these attitudes seem to inform his
views in Drennan.In addition, he wrote on the Drennan case itself
on a number of occasions, and even had some thoughts about
the responsibilities of judges in a democratic society-thoughts
stimulated by one of Learned Hand's own most famous extrajudicial efforts. For Traynor, Baird seemed to be a remnant of the
past-formalistic, time-bound, and oddly not in keeping or consistent with the rational, orderly evolution of the common law. It
was to be discarded in keeping with Traynor's own attitudes
about the necessity of keeping legal change in touch with social
change.
1. Social Change
To Traynor, the problem of social change began with an understanding of the lessons of the past. "This much we know," he
wrote, "that we have left the daisy fields, the silent plains of the
nineteenth century, when laissez-faire commanded easy acceptance. We could afford then to take extravagant risks and to be
heedless of their consequences." 215 Furthermore, "laissezfaim had
ceased to be acceptable by the depression years, the years of
reckoning for the age of heedlessness." 216 In addition, the two

world wars "compelled us to realize that each of us has a direct
responsibility for the general welfare. Inevitably some part of that
obligation had to be made legally enforceable by a society given
the opprobrious term of 'welfare state' by those who would have
it remain static." 2 7 In short, "[f]ree enterprises are no longer
free in the old sense. ' 21 8 What we needed now, according to

Traynor, was a world dedicated to rational social and economic
planning that took into account the fact that we were in the
midst of " '[t]he Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution' " that
"has catapulted us into a new world of collective enterprise
wherein great corporations as well as government determine how
we live." 21 9 Rampant individualism inhibited the change necessary
for the benefit of all. The conditions of freedom should be ac214. For an examination of the extrajudicial record, see John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1643 (1995).
215. Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. LF.
230, 231 (1956).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id
219. Id.
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commodated to provide for economic prosperity and growth. 220
"Whatever our admiration for ancient arts, few of us would turn
the clock back to live out what museums preserve .... There is
now general agreement that we have moved out of the Ice
Age."221

2.

Social Change and California

Traynor was particularly concerned about the effects of social
change in California. He referred to the enormous growth that
occurred in mid-twentieth-century California: "[w]ithin that generation the state evolved from a thinly populated landscape of
vast mountains and deserts and farmlands to the seventh largest
economy in the world." 22 Traynor often discussed data and personal observations in legal speeches and writings: "the popula=3
tion has been increasing at the rate of some 33,000 a month,"
"[b]y the forties the population rush westward was on, and real
estate prices were trending upward,"22 4 California was "good, despite its massive growing pains,"225 and it "was a forward-looking
society. Though not an elder state in the Union, it [was]' a
6
pacesetter."2
As G. Edward White observed, "[t]he corpus of legal doctrine
created by the California Supreme Court prior to 1940 had been
of average size and scope for a moderately populated, predominantly rural state in an age of quiescent government." However,
"suddenly California became one of the nation's most populous
and most urbanized states, with attendant growth pains." 227 In addition, "U]udicial decisions, in this context, needed to be modernized, so that they could be responsive to the social conditions

220. See id
221. Roger J. Traynor, Comment on The Courts and Laumaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 48, 50 (Monrad Paulsen ed. 1959).
222. Roger J. Traynor, TransatlanticReflections on Leeways and Limits of Appellate
Courts, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 255, 255 (1980).
223. Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U.
CHI. L. REv. 211, 211 (1957).
224. Roger J. Traynor, Some Not So Lost Causes of Action, 22 Sw. L.j 551, 552 (1968).
225. Roger J. Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges, 53 VA. L. REv. 1266, 1266
(1967).
226. Roger J. Traynor, The Supreme Court's Watch on the Law, in 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA 207 (J. Edward Johnson ed. 1966).
227. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING

AMERICAN JUDGES 295 (1976).
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of contemporary California life ."228
White commented that:
More than any appellate judge of his time, Traynor witnessed a
dramatic change in the social context of his decisions. If American society in the years between 1940 and 1970 became increasingly complicated, heterogeneous, consumer-oriented, diversified, and dominated by the presence of institutions of
government, California was at the crest of those trends. No
state in the nation had developed so rapidly.?29
Therefore, when the general contractor's attorney, in his brief
in Drennan, argued that the construction industry was growing
rapidly in California and would be thrown into chaos if the old
rules of offer and acceptance applied, and that California was a
leader in the invocation of promissory estoppel, he tapped, consciously or not, into one of Traynor's pet themes. 30° The theme
resonated with Traynor, and progress had its day. Traynor
frowned on old ways of looking at the world and welcomed
change.
3.

Precedent and Law Reform

Because Baird was a decision by the federal circuit court of appeals, it technically did not serve as precedent for the California
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, Traynor had a broad view of legal
decisions in need of reform. If the reasoning of any,case might
interfere with the development of a rule suited for California, it
needed to be addressed and rebuffed. During his tenure, Traynor "helped set the law's ghosts at rest in the past to which they
belonged. In property, family law, conflict of laws, taxation, and
procedure, he discarded or reformulated older doctrines to recast the law in contemporary terms." 231 Of course, his torts and
products liability decisions remain prime examples of his reformist impulses. Lest there be any doubt about what was happening
in Traynor's decisions, G. Edward White has noted that one of
the central, preoccupying themes of Traynor's speeches was "the
228. Id.
229. Id. at 314. For additional confirmation of this observation, see BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 527-28, 531 (1993).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
231. SCHWARTZ, supra note 229, at 530 (citations omitted). He also rewrote other
doctrines, including the rules of charitable, family, and sovereign immunity. See id. at
529 (citations omitted).
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problem of the obsolete precedent." 232
Traynor had plenty to say about precedent-of all sizes,

shapes, lineages, and jurisdictions. He started at an early age in
1926 in law school with a student casenote that he wrote on the
rule from 1603 in Dumpor's Case.233 "The extent to which courts
sometime blindly follow precedent" was illustrated by the "history" of Dumpor's Case. "It was originally without foundation [and
still is,] [i]f no law should survive the reasons upon which it is
founded surely it should not be perpetuated if it is founded on
no reason at all." 23 Traynor essentially followed that insight for

more than the next half-century.
Though Traynor had been a relatively prolific scholar as a law
professor before joining the bench in 1940, he virtually stopped
writing, other than in opinions, for the fifteen or so years after
his appointment. However, in 1956, he returned in earnest, and
began reflecting on his judicial experience. A central theme of
this work was precedent, and Justice Traynor did not much care
for it.
The examples are almost too numerous to catalogue, but a few
will convey the sentiment.
In the interest of coherence as well as efficiency, it is for the
courts to consign to oblivion what has proved over the years to
be chaff. Now that space and time are at a premium for the
storage and study of even superlative matter, it is folly to clutter
and confuse work papers with materials that are either obsolete
or repetitious or ridden with inept or fallacious analysis that
cannot survive the light of reason. Less than ever can we assume that all the good enough thoughts and ways of yesterday
are adequate today, however superbly undated some remain.

232. G. Edward White, Introduction to THE TRAYNOR READER: Nous VERRONS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS BY THE HONORABLE ROGER J. TRAYNOR 2 (1987). One is reminded that
Traynor referred to as "obsolete" the unilateral contract revocation rule before its reformation in § 45 of the first Restatement of Contracts. See supra text accompanying note
185.

233. Dumpor v. Symms, 4 Coke Rep. 119b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (1603).
234. Comment, Real Pmperty: Landlord and Tenant: The Rule in Dumpor's Case, 14
CAL. L. Rav. 328, 328, 333 (1926). Traynor's attempt at aphorism here sounds a little like
Holmes's famous passage from "The Path of the Law."
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). Perhaps
Traynor was influenced by Holmes's sentiment, published less than thirty years before
Traynor wrote his student casenote.
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What is indelibly dated as of yesterday may now be a light-year's
distance from problems that reach deep into tomorrow. There
is no place in the living law for period pieces or parrot
paragraphs or ill-conceived figments of what has passed as legal
2 35
imagination.
The theory of judging that emerged was not exactly passive.
"The great mass of cases are decided within the confines of stare
decisis. Yet there is a steady evolution, for it is not quite true that
there is nothing new under the sun ....

" For "[c]ourts have a

creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost its touch
with reality and should be abandoned and reformulated to meet
236
new conditions and new moral values."
"None of us would disturb the law that is truly and rationally
settled." 237 Yet "the plea of reliance would perpetuate archaic
precedents." 238 Therefore, "we should examine old rules regularly, as a good workman examines the machines to which he is
assigned, to see first if they are properly put together, and then
if they are in good working order."239 Otherwise, "[t]he alternative is to live uneasily with an unfortunate precedent by wearing
it thin with distinctions that at last compel a cavalier pronouncement, heedless of the court's failure to make a frank overruling,
that it must be deemed to have revealed itself as overruled by its
24°
manifest erosion."
As a judicial strategy, Traynor thought that it was far better to
face the fact:
There are of course precedents originally so unsatisfactory or
grown so unsatisfactory with time as to deserve liquidation. Unfortunately a court often lacks the forthrightness to bring about
their demise. Instead it may pursue the unhappy alternatives of
keeping them alive and kicking irrationally or of sustaining
them half alive. It may blindly follow a sorry precedent only because it lacks the wit or the will or the courage to spell out why
the precedent no longer deserves to be followed. 241
The lesson was clear. "[D]ogmatic adherence to the past per-

235.
109, 122
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Roger J. Traynor, Better Days in Court for a New Day's Problems, 17 VAND. L REV.
(1963).
Traynor, supra note 215, at 232.
RogerJ. Traynor, Unjustified Reliance, 42 MINN. L REv. 11, 14 (1957).
Traynor, supra note 221, at 54.
Traynor, supra note 237, at 14.
Traynor, supra note 221, at 54.
Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard Cases Can Make Good

Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 223, 230 (1962).
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petuates bad law."242 For his contribution, Traynor, of course, was

branded as an activist. However, as G. Edward White has noted:
The term had no such [pejorative] meaning during the years
of Traynor's tenure. Activism for Traynor merely meant a sense
that, for a variety of reasons, judicial performance of a given
task, as opposed to the performance of the task by a jury or a
legislature or an administrative body, furthered
the values of ra24 3
tionality, competence or disinterestedness.
Opinions needed to be justified by reason; the past could not
stand in the way of reasons forged from social change. Bernard
Schwartz has placed a discussion of Traynor in a chapter entitled
"Pragmatic Instrumentalism.

' 244

The labels, however, are

unimportant.
Traynor was suspicious of the term "activism," referring to it
once as "so befuddled a term." 245 "As an interpreter," he noted,
the judge "is necessarily an active analyst and not a passive ora-.
cle. An actively analytical judge bears no relation to the illdefined character, the so-called judicial activist." 246 As for Justice
Traynor, he simply described himself "[als one receptive to
change but wary of dogma in old forms or new ... "247 Therefore, Traynor viewed Hand's opinion in Baird as dogma, taking
the unusual position on more than one occasion to explain why
he thought Drennan was important.
4. Traynor on Drennan
Traynor did not say much on the general subject of contract
law in his extrajudicial writings. On occasion, he focused on the
Statute of Frauds, urging its reform. 248 However, he primarily
confined himself to general observations which revealed his views
of the common law. He talked about "property and contracts,
where reasonable expectations are the dominant rules of the
game,"24 9 and "reasonable expectations" informed his promissory
estoppel analysis in Drennan. However, he also linked contract
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
White, supra note 232, at 2; see also WHITE, supra note 227, at 307-09.
ScHwARTZ, supra note 229, at 527-35.
Roger J. Traynor, The Limits ofJudicidal Creativity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1033

(1978).
246. Id. at 1026.
247. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L REV. 739, 739 (1970).
248. See Traynor, supranote 224, at 554-56.
249. Traynor, supra note 245, at 1035.
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law to his outlook about the requirement of legal change. In the
year following the decision in Drennan, he remarked that "the
law of contracts was once well served by delightful causeries of
learned judges that clarified the meaning of obligation. Such
causeries, however, proved inadequate to provide an expansion
and diversification of words to correspond with that of business
enterprise." 250 He announced, "We are taking a new look at contracts." 25 1 The footnote for the observation cited just one caseDrennan.

52

Twice in the 1960s, Traynor chose to discuss the Drennan case
at some length. Significantly, within a year or so after Drennan
was decided, Traynor began integrating commentary on the case
into his general speechmaking. His discussions of Drennan in
1960 and 1968 are very similar in their factual renditions, as well
as in retracing the steps he took to arrive at his doctrinal result
(and he occasionally borrowed from the opinion without benefit
of quotation-they were his words after all).253 Traynor recounted
his journey from no bilateral contract, through unilateral contract, to promissory estoppel. However, the tale now had a number of more elaborate arguments.
The first argument was doctrinal. Traynor pointed out that
under section 45 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts the implied subsidiary promise raised to prevent revocation once performance began was "ingeniously contained within conventional
terminology . . . [w]hatever its orthodox language, this implica-

tion was contrived to give effect, not to a considered bargain, but
to the justifiable expectations of the parties." 25 4 The real purpose
or intent of section 45, therefore, was not to continue to enshrine bargain theory, but to pave the road for getting at how
the parties expected the relationship to work. This "tacitly
opened the way for a shift in emphasis from the language of bargain and consideration to the language of reliance as a basis for
implying an enforceable subsidiary promise not to revoke an offer." 255 In other words, "[t]he real significance of part performance is not that it may be construed as consideration . . . but

250. Traynor, supra note 221, at 48-49.
251. Traynor, supra note 235, at 110.
252. See id. at 110 n.4.
253. Compare Roger J. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7
UTAH L. REv. 157, 162-63 (1960) [hereinafter Traynor, Badlands], with Traynor, supra
note 224, at 558-60.
254. Traynor, Badlands, supra note 253, at 162.
255. Id. at 163.
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that it can be identified realistically as one form of reliance." 256
From this point in the unilateral contract analysis, it was a
short step to its application in the bilateral contract context.
Was it not then possible for other forms of justifiable reliance
likewise to call up an implied promise and render it enforceable? We advanced to the analogy, in the offer for a bilateral
contract such as the subcontractor's bid, that reasonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change in position
affords a compelling basis also for implying a subsidiary promise not to revoke. We could not equate this form of reliance
with bargained-for consideration as the reliance evinced by part
performance had been equated. Thus the issue resolved itself
that plaintiffs reliance served to make the defendant's offer irrevocable, even though there was no consideration "in the
sense of something
that is bargained for and given in
7
exchange."2
In short, "[t]his solution combined the theory of implied promise in section 45 of the Restatement of Contractswith the theory of
promissory estoppel set forth in section 90."258
The second argument identified what the purpose of this doctrinal exercise had been-to attack older rule-bound notions of
consideration doctrine that prevented the parties from attaining
their reasonable expectations.
Our analysis leading to that decision brought us up sharply
against the question-begging word consideration,which labels so
many disintegrating trees along judicial trails, awaiting to give
dubious shelter to contemporary cases. We looked beyond them

to the oaks from little peppercorns growing and placed a contemporary case within the sheltering ambit of contemporary
live oaks.259

Therefore, it was time to reexamine consideration doctrine as
applied to the subcontractor/general contractor bidding process.
Hand's opinion in Bairdwas a good example of the intrusion of
consideration doctrine and bargain theory in the realm of offer
and acceptance. "If in the process of evolution the peppercorn
suffered one more diminution of status, few would dispute that it
had long evinced no sign of growth other than growing tinier."26°
Therefore, "U]udges too are bound to have learned from the
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.

259. Id.
260. Traynor, supra note 224, at 560.
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cases that there has been evolution in the law of contracts as in
other law, the stir of subterranean growth that will push through
2 61
ground that has been well tended.
The third and final argument, therefore, addressed why legal
change was required in Drennan.Traynor described the position
he faced in the case as one where "the choice lies between an
uncomfortably narrow traditional shelter and one expansive
enough for the case but as yet untried, though within easy
reach." 262 When the case arose, "it soon became apparent that
the few precedents on comparable problems offered no ready solution to the instant case. ' 263 Realistically what "precedent,"
other than Baird, could have fit his description? Traynor voiced
surprise at the resistance to an obvious resolution, "because the
facts are so simple that you may wonder how they could possibly
prove baffling to a court." 264 So there was Traynor's view of the
Hand opinion-an unsatisfactory "precedent" that made a correct result "baffling" to a court. Traynor, to extend his forest
metaphor, simply uprooted the obsolete precedent that stood in
the way of new growth.
5. Traynor on Hand
When Traynor ended his almost complete self-imposed extrajudicial silence in 1956, he began by reflecting on "Law and Social
Change in a Democratic Society."265 At the very end of the article, he confronted the views of Learned Hand. The subject was
civil liberties, not private law, and Traynor was concerned about
the position "that courts have no active responsibility in the safeguard of those" liberties. 266 Courts may "not have the sole or
even the major responsibility; but can we say that they have
none?" 267 He quoted Hand's "haunting words" 268 from his famous speech entitled "The Spirit of Liberty." 269
261. Traynor, Badlands, supranote 253, at 163.
262. Id. at 162.
263. Traynor, supra note 224, at 558.

264. Id
265. See Traynor, supra note 215.
266. Id. at 241.
267. Id.

268. Id.
269. LEARED HAND, THE SPIurr OF IABERTY 189-91 (1952).
ered before a huge crowd, which was estimated at one and
1944 in New York City's Central Park on the occasion of an
ceremony at which 150,000 recently naturalized citizens were

Hand's speech was deliva half million, in May of
"I Am an American Day"
sworn. For a full account
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I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false
hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution,
no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court,
can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no
270
constitution, no law, no court to save it.
To this sentiment Traynor entered a very gentle, respectful,
and pointed demurrer. "But is it not precisely because it lies
there that it has declared itself in a constitution to be invoked by
courts insistently, unfailingly, against those in power, in legislatures or out of them, who threaten to use that power to make
men fearful and finally still?" 27 1 Like other men and women,
"[t]he judges whose job it is to apply it must carry liberty in
their hearts even when other men have ceased to ....Who is to
say it is irretrievably lost until it has died in the hearts of those
2 72
whose job it was to care that it lived in the hearts of others?1
The responsibility for preserving liberty "in the hearts of men
and women" is "a joint concern of judges and people-not people in a symbolic mass-but individuals." 273 Traynor concluded,
"[s]o Learned Hand's words continue to haunt us; one would
not say them nay. One would only restate the court's obligation,
perhaps as an act of faith." 274 Traynor simply understood the obligation of judges, in the spheres both of public and private law,
275
differently than Hand.

of the speech and its reception, see GuNTHER, supra note 76, at 547-52.
270. Traynor, supra note 215, at 241.

271. Id,
272. Id
273. Id.
274. Id
275. For Hand's deferential view towards precedent, see GuNrHER, supra note 76, at
148-49, 298-300, 619-20. A measure of Hand's distance from Traynor on the subject is
the following from Hand:
Nor is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but
whose birth is distant; on the contrary I conceive that the measure of its
duty is to divine, as best as it can, what would be the event of an appeal in
the case before [it].
Id. at 620 (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944)).

The differences between the two judges' views might be partly explained by their distinctive places in the judicial system (Hand, first as a trial court judge, and then as an
intermediate appellate court judge, as opposed to Traynor, always a judge of a court of
last resort within a state system), but the evidence indicates that the disagreement ran
deeper than that.
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CONCLUSION

In 1961, Stewart Macaulay published an interesting and important article: "Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts.

'2 6

Ma-

caulay undertook his task about two-thirds of the way through
Traynor's tenure on the bench, but Drennan had been decided
relatively recently. Of course, Macaulay was compelled to take account of it. Generally, Macaulay found that Traynor's "work in
contracts excites ...

academic interest because he is willing, per-

haps even eager, to strike out in new directions, overturning and
modifying old rules and establishing new ones. ' 27 7 He also
warned that "Justice Traynor's contracts opinions cannot always
be taken at face value. Some are ingeniously technical and legalistic with almost no hint of the reasons for all the virtuosity. See,
e.g., Drennan." 278 Macaulay used Drennan as an illustration of a
type of opinion that "involved matchless legalistic argument but
shunned any policy discussion." 279 The Drennan case, however,
placed in the context of a confrontation with Baird, looks like an
example of Macaulay's Traynor, implicitly and explicitly, "willing,
perhaps even eager, to strike out in new directions."
Macaulay also sought to explain where Traynor fit more
broadly into the general theoretical goals of contract policy. He
divided these goals into two general categories-"support of the
market institution" and "social control to achieve economic welfare." The goals were further subdivided into means to attain the
goals: on the market side were self-reliance, and transactional
and functional policies, and on the nonmarket side were relief of
hardship and economic planning policies. 2 ° Macaulay's problem
276. Stewart Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812
(1961).
277. Id. at 812.
278. Id. at 812 n.1.
279. Id. at 813 n.1.
280. See id. at 813-17. The categories, as acknowledged by Macaulay, see id. at 813
n.4, are not unlike those suggested by a reading of FRIEDRICH KESSLER & MALCOLM PrrMAN SHARP, CASES ON CoNTRACS 1-9 (1953), stressing the tension between freedom of
contract and the regulation, social or otherwise, of individual bargains. For further development of the insights, see FRIEDRCIH KESSLER & GRANT GiLMORE, CoNTRACTS: CASES
AND MATERMAS 1-14 (2d ed. 1970). See also George K. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1932). For Macaulay's own elaboration
and application of the models, see Stewart Macaulay, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L.
REv. 1133 (1959), and Stewart Macaulay, PrivateLegislation and the Duty to Read-Business
Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1966).
For a later version, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976), and Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in
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in classifying Drennan was to determine on which side the case
belonged-as an example basically of market support activity or
as an example of an interventionist model of social control. Macaulay's solution was to place Drennan primarily on the market
side, though not within all of its policies. He noted that "there is
no clear example of the self-reliance policy to be found in his
contracts decisions, and many of them reach results directly contrary to those called for by this policy."n' The self-reliance/market policy, according to Macaulay, emphasized that "[w] herever a
rational economic man could have protected himself or made a
choice the court should not protect the individual or make a
choice for him." 282 That policy, of course, has more than faint
echoes in Hand's opinion in Baird,and so it is not surprising to
find no trace of it in Traynor's contracts jurisprudence.
On the market side, Macaulay placed Drennan within the category of functional policy-as an example of the creation of "generally applicable rules which facilitate bargaining by producing a
system or structure in which exchanges can take place. Rules
should be adopted which aid quick and rational bargaining
.. .. "283 Among the purposes of functional rules is "indicating
when reliance will be protected.... "2 Drennan was an example
of a functional rule that, first, protected "reliance by one bargainer, . . . in situations where that reliance is foreseeable by the
other party"; second, followed "common business practices
rather than attempting to force bargaining into the legal stereotype"; and third, involved "the imposition of absolute liability because . .. the obligation turns neither on a manifestation of
choice nor on fault but" instead on Traynor's "view of the de285
mands of functional policy."
Yet, Macaulay also recognized that Drennan potentially fit in
more than one category. In general he thought "[a] great deal
of overlap among these policies is possible," 286 and that "things
will not [always] fit neatly into a single pigeonhole." 287 So the decision may also be placed in the nonmarket/economic welfare
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L REv. 563 (1982).
281. Macaulay, supra note 276, at 817.
282. Id. at 814.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 833.
286. Id. at 815.
287. Id. at 833.
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category, particularly under the relief of hardship policy.2 8 The

evidence for placing it on the nonmarket side was vague and
28 9

sketchy-"unsatisfactory" according to Macaulay.
Some of the reasons for finding nonmarket ideas in Drennan
have to do with the plight of the subcontractor. It is possible to
view the subcontractor/general contractor relationship as a battle
of unequals, or the relatively advantaged and disadvantaged.
Each party seeks to highlight the manner in which he will be vulnerable or not, depending on the legal resolution. One can see
Traynor's solution as reducing the exposure or risk of the general contractor in the marketplace, even though it might appear
that in most situations the general contractor might be the economically superior party as reflected in its larger stake and risk
in the overall transaction. Yet, Traynor seemed to compensate for
that market superiority by requiring the general contractor to
notify the subcontractor immediately of the award of the general
contract and, consequently, of the acceptance of the offer that
has been made irrevocable by reliance. In other words, Traynor
understood that the subcontractor may be vulnerable and sought
to adjust the equities between the parties. Yet, he apparently believed that, on balance, the general contractor bears a disproportionate share of risk because it is relying on numerous subcontractors' bids that eventually may redound to the benefit of
subcontractors as well as general contractors.
Macaulay also pointed out that, six years before Traynor decided Drennan, Franklin Schultz had published an empirical
study on business practices in the construction industry.29° Schultz's data suggested "that some generals, after using a particular
sub's bid in computing their own, when they get the job renego291
tiate with a number of subcontractors to get even lower bids."

288. See id. at 844. Macaulay mentioned that "Traynor has had little to do with the
relief-of-hardship policy" because, in part, it "stands directly opposed to the transactional policy as a means of supporting the market, which he has so often championed."
Id. at 844. The market transactional policy seeks "to carry out the particulartransaction
brought before" courts, therefore, "[t]he court should discover the bargain that was
made and enforce it." Id. at 814 (emphasis in original). Macaulay observed that the
"bulk" of Traynor's contracts rulings fell into the transactional category. &L at 818.
289. Id. at 845-46.
290. See id. at 845 (citing Schultz, supra note 8).
291. Id. There is another way to look at the data: most general contractors who are
awarded the general contract do, in fact, "feel bound to give [the] subcontractor the
job," as 65 of the 80 general contractors surveyed responded, and 75 of the 93 subcontractors surveyed "feel bound to do the job" knowing their bid has been used despite
an intervening price increase of materials (a different situation from a discovery of a
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Schultz thought binding the subcontractor through Section 90,
but leaving the general contractor free to bid shop was unfair,
and recommended not invoking reliance, thereby allowing the
subcontractor to revoke and leaving some measure of power in
the subcontractor's position. 292 Macaulay noted that "Traynor re293
jected Professor Schultz's advice in deciding the Drennan case,"
but I do not believe this is entirely true. From Traynor's point of
view, Schultz had committed a cardinal sin-he approved of
Baird. "Can it be," asked Schultz, that "the critics of Judge
Learned Hand for his opinion in Gimbel Bros. have looked at the
294
question solely from the general contractor's point of view?"
Schultz's accusation of bias could not be applied to Traynor because he recognized the vulnerabilities of the subcontractor. By
improving the rationality of the market process, he hoped to
have the best of both possible worlds. The general contractor's
reliance would be ratified legally, and the subcontractor would
be protected as far as feasible from bid shopping by requiring an
immediate response from the general contractor without the possibility of resuming negotiations or bargaining. Presumably, that
would answer some of Schultz's concerns, 295 but more impor-

mistake in the bid). See Schultz, supra note 8, at 260, 267. It is, of course, possible that
Traynor read the survey and concluded that the result in Drnnan was generally consistent with trade practice. Despite the common-law rule on the revocability of offers,
other factors or sanctions, such as reputation, goodwill, or moral or ethical sentiments
about promises or good faith, may lead parties to conclude that they are bound to each
other. One general contractor reported feeling bound because the subcontractor was
now "part of your organization." Id. at 260. Interestingly enough, in an empirical study
conducted after Drennan was decided, subcontractors unanimously indicated that they
felt bound to perform the work if "the general has used your bid in his own bid but
you also discover that you made a mistake in your bid." See Note, Another Look, supra
note 8, at 1734. Of course, the surveys did not fully address the question of the subcontractors' motivations or whether their responses were a result of feeling pressured, coerced, or vulnerable in the marketplace, and the surveys provided only limited evidence
about whether whatever rule emerged as the legal solution to the problem helped or
hindered the bidding process.
292. See Schultz, supra note 8, at 284-85.
293. Macaulay, supra note 276, at 845.
294. Schultz, supranote 8, at 284.
295. Schultz wrote:
Some proof of reliance can be found in the inclusion of the exact bid in
the general 'estimate. Better proof is evidence that the general not only
used the bid as a partial basis for his total bid but that he had no intention
of negotiating with the sub for a better price or of "shopping" for a
cheaper bid from another sub after the general contract was awarded.
Id. at 248 (footnotes omitted). Schultz further stated that "[a] corollary fact discounting
reasonable reliance would be any delay on the general's part in accepting the bid after
the award ....

Even if there is no time stipulation, the general must accept within a
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tandy, in providing as much protection for all parties, Traynor
was free to reject Hand's analysis of the legal problem.
Macaulay's placement of Drennan in both market and
nonmarket camps (however tentatively on the nonmarket side) is
instructive because it reveals the duality of Traynor's thought in
response to Hand. Traynor seemed to be saying that it was time
to rethink and modernize the categories of market goals-that
nonmarket and market factors could be harmonized, rather than
poised forever in opposition. In furtherance of promoting or facilitating market activity, it might make sense to think of the par-,
ties as embedded in a relationship, with each party pursuing the
same goal. (It might even be possible to interpret the results of
Schultz's study as an indication of the reasonable expectations of
most market actors). If the goal was to harmonize the relationship, then the vulnerabilities of each party should be reduced.
The tort-like notion of absolute liability for a mistaken bid helps
take the situation away from contract norms to point instead to a
concept of responsibility imposed from external nonmarket
sources. When people deal with each other in the marketplace,
they have duties imposed on them that do not arise out of traditional contractual categories. However, Traynor implies that the
duties do derive from contract norms because the notion of responsibility comes from both the parties' decisions to engage voluntarily in market behavior and their reasonable expectations
about what should occur.
Near the end of his life, Traynor wrote "[flreedom in the view
of many special pleaders, is not the harmonizing of many individual interests within a variegated society, but the supremacy of
the capital I against a lower-case world." 296 Thus, for Traynor, the
wisdom in a modern, interdependent, interrelated market society
was not in the pursuit of unrestrained, unprotected individualism. It was, instead, in the recognition that many interests might
be harmonized, and that freedom would be maximized by learning how to deal with different interests in an increasingly complex society. People act in this way because, as he repeatedly
stressed in Drennan, it is in their best interest to do so; therefore,
the courts should acknowledge that fact legally. It was neither
pure altruism, nor pure individualism. The trajectory of individual freedom had changed. This is perhaps why Macaulay perreasonable time .... " Id. at 250.
296. Roger J. Traynor, FalingRocks and Rising Risks in New Lands of Law, 1977 BYU
L. REv. 535, 537 (1977).
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ceived that Drennan might have claims on both his market and
nonmarket categories. Macaulay concluded that Traynor's "innovations on a case-by-case basis may have provided a needed dynamic in the California system of contract law to modernize it
and align it with the goal of supporting the market." 297 Yet, he
noted that Traynor's contracts opinions contained balances and
"compromises" between the sometimes conflicting goals of contract law.298 Perhaps rather than balancing the competing de-

mands of contract policy, Traynor was groping, successfully or
not, for a resolution of its inherent tensions. For Traynor, the
only way to continue to foster freedom was to recognize that
others can help us enhance that freedom, rather than continually pose a threat to limit it.299

Not long ago, Charles Fried announced that he had changed
his mind about Hand and Traynor, Baird and Drennan. Where
once he had approved of the result in Drennan,and as eventually
codified in section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 300 he now preferred "the terse hard-headedness of
297. Macaulay, supra note 276, at 863.
298. Id. at 864.
299. It is possible to contend that Traynor has simply established an alternative
model of individualism-"a rights-oriented individualism" inhering in the recognition of
contractual rights growing out of transactions, and that transactions in the modern
world, tending to be multifaceted, relational, and sometimes longer term, look different
than they once did. Therefore, Traynor was simply adapting individualism to modem
reality.
[This] rights-oriented individualism is consistent with an aggressive demand
for compensation (or other remedies) when important interests are perceived to have been violated. By contrast, an individualism employing selfsufficiency and personal responsibility rather than rights is consistent with
the expectation that people should ordinarily provide their own protection
against injuries and should personally absorb consequences of harms they
fall to ward off.
David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song:.Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an Ameri-

can Community, 18 L & Soc'Y REy. 551, 558-59 (1984). See also id. at 559 n.11 (acknowledging that the categories "emerged from an ongoing dialogue" with me, so I guess it is
all right for me to use them here).
Though Engel's discussion is about personal injury cases, and not contracts, the
self-sufficiency category is similar to Macaulay's self-reliance market category (never used
by Traynor), and to Hand's "protect yourself" rhetoric in Baird In addition, Engel suggests that the self-sufficiency model of individualism may have "originated in an earlier
face-to-face community," id. at 559, perhaps not unlike a face-to-face community that
once yielded the traditional rules of offer and acceptance.
300. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-

54-56 (1981). The bidding process hypothetical that forms the basis of Fried's analysis does not contain a mistake in the bid. See id. at 55. Section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads: "An offer which the offeror should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the ofTION
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Learned Hand as against the more prolix-and I now think
sometimes sentimental-ruminations of Roger Traynor."3 °1 Ironically enough, Traynor rejected all claims to "sentimentalism" in
judging. He believed "that hard cases can make good law.... I
have in mind, not the proverbial hardship cases that we say make
bad law if they are sentimentally decided in violence to a clearly
applicable rule of law, but those hard cases that could plausibly
go either way." 3°2 And, he once remarked, a judge in family disputes "who must somehow resolve such shattering conflict is no
soft-hearted sentimentalist; he could not judge wisely if he
were." 3 3 Fried and Traynor would no doubt have debated about
the definition of sentimentalism. Traynor might also have responded that both Fried and Hand, far from being hard-headed,
were hopelessly naive. The world no longer functioned in the
way Hand imagined. On the contrary, Traynor, thought he,
rather than Hand, was rational, hard-headed, and practical in
redesigning old rules for a new set of economic understandings.

feree before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as
an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981).
301. Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 751, 752 n.10 (1987).
302. Traynor, supra note 241, at 224.
303. Roger J. Traynor, The Givers and Takers of Law, 18J. PUB. L. 247, 249 (1969).

